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WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

- Krainer's Strategy To Oppose Draken Jets, Reform OeVP
(Hubertus Czernin, et al.; PROFIL, 16 Mar 87)..... 1

DENMARK

- Papers View Possible Cabinet Composition After Election
(Various sources, 15, 17 Mar 87)..... 9
- Authors Comment, by Birgit Rasmussen 9
Nonsocialist Coalition Doomed, by Erik Meier Carlsen 12
'Chaos' If Party in Folketing 16
Liberal Leaders Squeeze Farmers 17
Liberals Court Farm Vote, Editorial 18
- Socialist People's Party Chief Attacked by Left for Wooing SDP
(Morten Larsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 21 Mar 87)..... 21

DENMARK/GREENLAND

- Atassut, Siumut Leaders Exchange Charges in Election Campaign
(GRØNLANDSPOSTEN, 18 Mar 87) 23
- Atassut States Price for Cooperation 23
Motzfeldt Cool Toward Cooperation 24
Paper on Election Outlook, Editorial 25

GREECE

U.S. Seen Providing 'Lifejacket' Arguments (I KATHIMERINI, 27 Feb 87).....	27
Reported Ulterior Motives of President-Prime Minister Confrontation (POLITIKA THEMATA, 6-12 Feb 87).....	29
National Repercussions of Rise of Fundamentalism in Turkey (Ant. Protonotarios; POLITIKA THEMATA, 13-19 Feb 87)....	32
Briefs	
Reported al-Qadhdhafi Mediation Offer	34

NORWAY

Parliament Rejects Socialist Left Party on Nuclear Ship Visits (AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Mar, 10 Apr 87).....	35
SV Chairman Explains Proposal, by Odd Inge Skjaevesland	35
Some Labor Party Support, by Thorleif Andreassen	36
Declining Liberal Party Striving for 'Green' Image (Ole Johan Nilsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 20 Mar 87).....	38
Red Electoral Alliance Holds National Convention (Alf Seeland; AFTENPOSTEN, 23 Mar 87).....	40
Conservative Daily Criticizes Socialist Left Congress EC Stand (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 6 Apr 87).....	42

SPAIN

Briefs	
Herri Batasuna Electorate	44

TURKEY

Ozal Responds to HURRIYET Article (Muharrem Sarikaya, Mustafa Bagdiken; HURRIYET, 7 Jan 87).....	45
Member of Parliament Expresses Fear of Khomeyni Influence (Bekir Coskun; GUNAYDIN, 6 Jan 87).....	47
Member of Parliament Complains of Lack of Freedom (Cuneyt Canver Interview; CUMHURIYET, 7 Feb 87).....	49
Commentary Calls for Improvement of Influence in Middle East (Nuri Eren; GUNAYDIN, 8 Feb 87).....	53

Demirel's View of Secularism Analyzed (Oktay Eksi; HURRIYET, 6 Jan 87).....	57
Chief Justices Speak About Use of 'Fatwa' (Kemal Saydamer; HURRIYET, 7 Jan 87).....	59
Compulsory Religion Classes Blamed for Threat to Secularism (Ilhan Selcuk; CUMHURİYET, 6 Jan 87).....	61
Commentary Urges Dismissal of AMP's Kececiler (Coskun Kirca; HURRIYET, 6 Jan 87)	64
Financing of Religious Orders Questioned (Ugur Mumcu; CUMHURİYET, 7 Jan 87).....	66
Commentary Questions Motives Behind Turban Issue (Oktay Akbal; CUMHURİYET, 7 Jan 87).....	69

ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Paper Comments on Growing Problem of Youth Unemployment (Editorial; GRØNLANDSPOSTEN, 25 Mar 87).....	71
---	----

FRANCE

Papers Analyze Nation's Economic Situation (LIBERATION, 26 Feb 87; LES ECHOS, 6 Mar 87).....	73
INSEE's Inflation Estimates, by Francoise Fressoz	73
Balladur Advocates Patience	75

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Von Buelow Reopens Bundeswehr Structure, Doctrine Argument (Andreas von Buelow; WEHRTECHNIK, Nov 86).....	76
--	----

GREECE

Briefs	
Mirage Aircraft Offsets	90
WEU Membership	90

ITALY

Foreign Trade Ministry Issues Requirements for Arms Exports (GAZZETTA UFFICIALE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA, No 284, 6 Dec 86).....	91
---	----

PORTUGAL

NATO Veto Considered in Spanish Coordination Request (O JORNAL, 10-16 Apr 87).....	96
---	----

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KRAINER'S STRATEGY TO OPPOSE DRAGEN JETS, REFORM OEVF

Vienna PROFIL in German 16 Mar 87 pp 16-21

[Article by Hubertus Czernin, Christoph Kotanko, and Franz F. Wolf: "Throw Away Your Fear, Alois--Styria's Mobilization Against Dragen Jets Is But a Reserve Exercise for the Final Stage in the Battle Against Alois Mock"; first paragraph is introductory motto taken from "Grundzuege der militaerischen Landesverteidigung" [Principles of Military National Defense], third updated version by General Staff Colonel Walter Fuernhaber]

"Civil resistance is a necessary complement of military national defense for the purpose of documenting one's determination to take a stand and of supporting the country's forces of defense."

Josef Krainer is a law-abiding man who adheres strictly to the defense doctrine, even if Emil Spannocchi, the former head of the armed forces, finds that "that wild fellow is a little cracked."

"When the Dragen jets arrive, we will be at the Zeltweg airport," said Krainer's party adjutant Gerhard Hirschmann in his introductory remarks at the conference of provincial party secretaries at the Vienna OeVP [Austrian People's Party] headquarters last Wednesday, thus passing on the province president's marching orders.

Krainer is moving on solid ground. United as seldom before in the turbulent history of the province, the Styrians are lining up for the defensive battle. In a unanimous resolution, the government of the province has voiced its opposition against any attempt to station the 24 Swedish Saab-Draken interceptors in Zeltweg and Graz-Thalerhof. With a big majority, including the Socialists, the Landtag endorsed this resolution. And Josef Krainer, who calls himself a representative of an "old stalwart people," does not miss an opportunity to stress the fact that 244,000 Styrians--"more than in any previous petition"--have signed the anti-Draken petition.

This Tuesday, when the National Defense Council meets at the Office of the Chancellor in Vienna, the province president will launch the first open battle against the federal government. Flanked by a triumvirate of experts--headed by Styrian public health specialist Josef R. Moese, who was appointed by Krainer's father, and including the leaders of the two big parties in the

Landtag--Krainer is going to present the "tremendous results" of the 834,000-schilling environmental study.

There he wants to force the grand coalition to admit defeat and to disabuse those who have been under the illusion that, when it comes down to it, the Styrians will not take everything so seriously. The incorrigible ones in his own party have already had to realize on previous occasions that the Styrians are not fooling. At the closed meeting of the OeVP Federal Executive in mid-February, Krainer confronted fellow-party Defense Minister Robert Lichal saying: "Let me tell you, Robert: You won't be able to place the junk with us."

In early March, Styrian OeVP Secretary, too, warned his Lower Austrian counterpart, Gustav Vetter, that the Styrians' anti-Draken revolt is not a gimmick for catching votes, saying: "I wish you would realize that we are really serious about it."

To support their argument, the Styrians can cite representative IMAS opinion polls according to which 85 percent of the Styrian population and 70 percent of all Austrians want to intercept the Draken jet.

In Graz, politics are closer to the zeitgeist than at the Lower-Austrian-dominated headquarters offices in Vienna. Uncouth military people seek to counter this by hand-woven rumors to the effect that Krainer is motivated only by personal circumstances, what with his sons having refused military service.

Affected by the Styrian defensive battle, Secretary General Michael Graff, too, has turned around--and he is not exactly known for his sensitivity. At the meeting of provincial party secretaries last week, Graff indicated his change in direction.

When Walter Heinzinger, secretary general of the OeAAB [Austrian Workers and Employees League affiliated with the OeVP] objected that he could not understand why the People's Party did not make up its mind to issue a political statement in favor of canceling the Draken agreement, Graff countered: "Surely that ranks behind a solution of the question by Parliament. The decision to appoint a subcommittee reveals the effort to objectivize the prerequisites for cancellation. It has to be established that cancellation is possible."

Further: "The secretary general is making every effort to see to it that the parliamentary subcommittee makes a fair examination in this direction so that we can cancel."

That caused Upper Austrian OeVP Secretary Josef Puehringer, otherwise rather one of the soft-spoken ones, to take a deep breath and say: "Say that out loud, Michel, and at long last make it apparent that we want out."

As a result of Graff's switch to interceptor-fighter, Hirschmann thought he detected a softening of the previously hardened positions within the OeVP,

commenting: "We Styrians now expect a political solution from the trio of Graff, Busek, and Ratzenboeck."

The result of the secretaries' meeting was a resolution urging the parliamentary subcommittee to examine all possibilities of a cancellation of the Draken agreement.

Thus the Styrians have managed to get the "cream of the second level" on their side--to quote one of those who participated in the session. Now only the Lower Austrian OeVP Secretary, Gustav Vetter, Mock spokesman Heribert Steinbauer, and Alfred Fahrner of the Farmers League were still resisting.

Not by chance all three are from Upper Austria, for it is there that Lichal, a hardliner in Draken matters, sets the tone. He is not even frightened by threats of violence. "We will not permit an operative demonstration at military airports," he states uncompromisingly with his Styrian fellow party members in mind.

The lineups are clear: On one side Lichal and his blue-yellow CV [Union of Catholics student organization] brethren; in the center Chairman Alois Mock, overtaxed in this matter; and on the other side the Styrians, who are getting more and more provincial party organizations to join their course. Even the new Tirol president, Alois Partl, has made it apparent in the meantime that the Draken jets have no place in his realm either.

Thus Krainer has managed to unhinge domestic policy over the Draken purchase issue. The OeVP is writhing with internal cramps, the Liberals are trembling in anticipation of possible revelations, and the Socialists, as is their wont, are trying to exploit the row.

The charges of corruption, they intend to ignore completely. Their former defense spokesman Walter Mondl, who chairs the Committee for Questions of National Defense attached to the party's Federal Executive, comments innocently on the controversial subject of party financing saying: "To be honest, I have no idea what that is supposed to mean."

See nothing, hear nothing, say nothing: that is also the method chosen to gloss over the fact that the Styrian comrades are making common cause with Krainer. Their way out of the intra-party dilemma is to point out repeatedly to the chaos within the OeVP which, as Federal Chancellor Vranitzky has warned, could also affect the operation of the government.

Thus the hopes of everyone rest on the subcommittee of the parliamentary defense committee which is supposed to get to the bottom of the Draken agreement. Yet, right off, a brake is to be applied there: OeVP Leader Fritz Koenig is considering to give the chairmanship to a member of the party which has conjured up this kind of Draken mess--a Liberal.

To make up for such parliamentary procedural tricks, the Styrians are coming to the National Defense Council Tuesday armed with heavy ammunition. Heading

them is parliamentary leader Bernd Schilcher, who is going to slam the result of his research of several weeks on the council table:

--The agreement between the Austrian Republic and the Swedish Saab Works amended in 1985;

--the report of the armed forces' "Ovid Study Group";

--the written record of a quartermaster discussion in January 1986;

--an oral report by Brigadier Ricahrd Bondi to then Defense Minister Helmut Kruenes on 30 May 1986;

--the minutes of high-level talks on 23 January 1987, with General Peter Corrieri in the chair, preparatory to introducing the Draken jets.

The sum of the documents, as stated by Schilcher, is the following: "The Federal Armed Forces are not prepared to tend to the Draken jets, either as far as logistical organization or as far as maintenance is concerned. These have an enormously overblown apparatus involved in trench warfare. For it, the Swiss have about 700 men, whereas we need 2,000. In terms of the current organization of the armed forces, a Draken action is just about impossible in Austria."

To support their case, the Krainer team presents a series of experts' statements, all of which are intended to show how disastrous the stationing of the Draken jets would be for Styria. The vociferous Josef Krainer painfully recalls the 36,000-schilling noise demonstration of a Draken flight approach, saying: "My ears hurt again whenever I think of it."

Not even the Styrian documentation solves the basic problem, though. How is one to arrange a political emergency cancellation of the agreement worth billions? The FPÖ's [Austrian Liberal Party] former Minister Helmut Kruenes says: "True, the Draken agreement is no model of a big international business deal, but I see no formal way of getting out of it. For reasons of legal policy, the republic cannot afford to do so."

The Draken opponents place part of their hopes in the technicalities of taking delivery of the Swedish bombers, starting away up north in May. The only question is who will be entrusted with the job. Many of the potential examiners are entangled with aircraft manufacturers, and it is almost impossible to come up with independent experts. So far Defense Minister Lichal has not shown any great interest in considering offers by not suspect Swiss or West German examiners.

What with a 2.4-billion deal, the Swedes will of course be astute enough to present a model specimen of a Draken jet. But even a successfully passed exam does not mean by a long shot that the interceptors will land on Austrian soil in the next few months. In the hangars of the Zeltweg military airport, they do not figure that the stationing will occur this year. The reason: The relevant forces are said to be unprepared for the operation both

from the personnel and the technological point of view. Thus there threatens an Austrian Draken paradox: Saab-Scania will deliver the first Draken jet in May or in June--to Angelholm, a Swedish airport, where it is to be tested by pilots of the Federal Armed Forces.

In political circles the rumor of a new cancellation variant is making the rounds. In lieu of the Draken jet, a product of the second jet generation, one might jump over to the younger Viggen jet. That would increase the cost but would mean adherence to the agreement with the Swedes and, above all, would amount to a priceless gain in time.

What is being ignored here, though, is the fact that the Viggen is not so much an air-space-surveillance aircraft as a fighter plane--in other words not suited to Austrian requirements--and moreover much more complicated and prone to breakdown as far as maintenance is concerned. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Georg Schmidt, who quit the service over the Draken purchase issue, says sarcastically: "The Viggen is so unsuitable that even I would advocate the Draken."

So the last hope of the Draken slayers is the track which was indicated a couple of weeks ago by OeAAB Secretary General Walter Heinzinger in the OeRF [Austrian Radio and Television] Domestic Report--that is, corruption and party funding.

The desire to uncover something illegal has already borne some bizarre fruit. Thus there appeared in newspaper offices last week a manifestly trumped-up letter from the now deceased second parliamentary Speaker Roland Minkowitsch to his "dear colleague Lichal" written in summer 1984.

In the forgery, Minkowitsch voices concern that the distribution of funds to the parties from the Draken pot may explode because so many people are privy to it. "Let us hope it'll work. Yours, Minkowitsch."

The focal point of all speculation is the 62-year-old Bolivian consul general, SPOe follower and Lower Austrian-born Hans Drescher. The Saab representative, who also made it to the rank of Landesjaegermeister in red Vienna, maintains excellent relations particularly with the officers who are responsible for the procurement of the Draken jets. For instance, Troops Inspector General Othmar Tauschitz is among the closest friends of the armament industry merchant. (He is also friends with Franz Sailler, department head for personnel in the Ministry of Defense.)

In his apprentice years a protege of socialist moguls Otto Probst and Otto Tschadek, Drescher has had a hand in almost every aircraft procurement of the Federal Armed Forces. The inconsistencies of one deal, the purchase of a dozen Jet Ranger helicopters, were dealt with in detail by a parliamentary investigative committee, and though he received a clean bill of health, his far-flung contacts in the Federal Armed Forces were exposed.

These also presented him with quite a career in the reserves. Although even in the Federal Armed Forces there existed doubts as to whether his military

career in World War II had taken an entirely proper course, he made it to colonel in the reserves.

In that capacity, his responsibilities extend to aviation in the event of mobilization. At his reserve exercises, he "learns whatever he needs for his business," says an officer at army headquarters.

His Draken commission according to his own statements amounts to 40.5 million schillings, but experts in the field estimate it at 135 million, and opponents of his claim that some of it went to one, two, or all parties by way of kickbacks.

Denying this, Drescher says: "That is of course out of the question. I hope Deputy Heinzinger will be compelled to back up his statements. Perhaps he only said it just to say something. He ought to have to prove it."

Former Defense Minister Kruenes, who inherited the Draken contract from his predecessor, Friedhelm Frischenschlager, has had his own experience with Drescher. He says: "He may be pleasant company. As for the officers, if I were they I would not make an attempt at a crucial phase of a big deal to incur the suspicion of doing someone a good turn."

Commenting on the possibility of the SPOe having exercised any influence on the choice of interceptors, Kruenes points out: "There is no denying that the Socialists were in favor of the Draken jets. The SPOe certainly exercised some influence. But that does not justify the claim of party funding."

Frischenschlager does not even go as far as that. He says: "Of course there were discussions in the government, but I can assert with a clear conscience that the SPOe did not exercise any pressure on me."

All rumors of corruption, kickbacks, and concealed party funding notwithstanding, no kind of proof has been furnished so far. If, therefore, the OeVP hope for a cheap way out of the contract should not materialize, the tear extending all the way to a split will go straight through the People's Party, for Josef Krainer is not prepared by any means to abandon his out-and-out demands. Nor does he need to so, because, in addition to the Styrians' independent stand, the attempt to overthrow the Draken deal is an indispensable component of his strategy for OeVP reform.

Reformer Krainer and his Styrian prethinkers are convinced that the policy of coalition is causing the OeVP to be lowered to the level of a center party. Reform, Draken, power station construction, and privatization of nationalized industry are politically attractive at best to those who habitually vote for the party--exactly according to the wishes of the Lower Austrian hardliners.

This is not the way to arouse the enthusiasm of creative, critical, liberal, and socially sensitive persons for the People's Party. So Josef II [allusion to Emperor Joseph II] Krainer formulates his credo as a man with qualities [as opposed to Musil's "Man Without Qualities"]: "By 1989 an infinite number of things have to happen. This is my parallel action: On one hand, to

perform government work and, on the other hand, to develop perspectives."

Activist Krainer is guided by the good old dual strategy formulated in the seventies by Heinz Fischer as a political survival strategy for the SPÖ but rejects the term, saying: "I don't like it because it is somewhat suspect and always means that one has one hand under a blanket."

The Styrian wants to enrich the calcified party machine with action groups and the erecting of new encounter platforms, thus enlisting the support of party-remote experts, citizen's initiatives, and informal political groups--and finally to dynamize the organization by the partial withdrawal of his provincial party. Krainer's summary: "Cooperation of a new kind." This, he adds immediately, "definitely is not to be interpreted as a split--something many of the other side would also like to see happen in order to divert attention from their own problems."

The Styrian People's Party might compete in elections "as an entity that is also formally independent." That, the Styrian argument goes, would even yield advantages to the federal party that could be expressed in gains. After all, the difference between provincial and federal election results in Styria is about 12 percent.

If, the argument goes, at least part of that difference is garnered, the federal party would be strengthened as well.

It is not clear whether this would work; the only thing that is clear is that Josef Krainer does not stand to lose anything with his independent stand.

Similarly motivated by Styrian politics is his attempt to detach the Styrian deputies of the upper and lowerhouses of the Federal Assembly from the rest of the ÖVP deputies and turn them into an independent group. This model has the neat advantage that the Styrians do not have to join the vote in federal decisions which are not to their liking and, therefore, also do not share in the responsibility for them.

This would not only be politically profitable in Styria but also would preserve the coalition of the party as a whole, for, to be on the safe side, a loosening of the cohesion of the parliamentary deputies was laid down as permissible in the working agreement of the two big parties. This was also the argument presented by Michael Graff with a subtle smile at the conference of provincial secretaries.

Yet, behind this political strategy there also hides a mortal danger for the grand coalition. And, sure enough, Federal Chancellor Vranitzky, supported by warnings, is already concerned about the continuation of the government alliance.

Even a premature end of the grand reform partnership is being taken into consideration by Josef Krainer. Entirely in accordance with the zeitgeist, he is interested, above all, in fixing a new, open, and attractive course for the People's Party. This also includes human sacrifices in the form of Alois

Mock and Michael Graff if the latter fails to negotiate the turn he has started in the direction of reforms. "The reform must also proceed as far as personnel is concerned," says the Styrian.

Mischievously, Josef Krainer in fact talks about his "personal ideas" concerning a successor to Mock, but only lets one guess about his secret favorites. Lauding Erhard Busek, praising Bernd Schilcher, and stroking Wolfgang Schuessel, he notes in a quite general way that a jump in generations would be of benefit to the party.

Concerning the timing of a Mock succession, he comes up with no more than the stereotype remark that Alois was elected to serve until the regular party congress in 1989.

Mock connoisseurs report that the tarnished chairman, whose situation corresponds to that of a rabbit during vivisection, is going to sound the retreat of his own accord. "Foreign minister," one of them says, "is something he has studied to be and something honorable."

Black hopes are directed toward a quick change in chairmen just before the next National Council elections. The coup has already been given a code name: "Haider effect."

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PAPERS VIEW POSSIBLE CABINET COMPOSITION AFTER ELECTION

Authors Comment

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Mar 87 p 6

[Article by Birgit Rasmussen: "Red Majority--Sink or Swim"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] "Unless the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party [SF] jettison the dead weight, a possible red majority government after the next election will soon break down. And there is very little time left." A talk with Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, authors of the debate book, "Red Majority."

How would a red majority consisting of the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party handle things internally and externally if this becomes a reality after the next election? Can this be a functional alternative or is there too much that divides the parties, in spite of some overtures, and do both sides sail around with so much dead weight in the hold that a cooperation is doomed to failure?

These are undeniably interesting questions which TV political reporter Karen Jespersen and media researcher Ralf Pittelkow examine in their recently published debate book, "Red Majority." He is a Social Democrat with a past in the Left-Socialist Party [VS] and SF, while she has not been affiliated with any party since she left VS in 1980. A party they totally discount in this context "because its basic position is to refuse to vote for any cuts, so it could never be part of a permanent cooperation, aside from the fact that it will probably be swept out of Folketing in the next election."

The two authors are concerned. As things stand today they think it is very doubtful that a possible red majority after the next election could hold up for purely political reasons. And if it does not hold up, it will poison the chances for a cooperation between the Social Democrats and SF far into the future. "Let's say that they form a government together and things go wrong--they start fighting with each other--well, the experiment could not be repeated until at least after the year 2000," said Ralf Pittelkow.

And Karen Jespersen said: "If they don't throw some of the 'dead weight' overboard, an ordinary political analysis shows that a cooperation will quickly collapse."

Ostrich Policy

Then would they conclude that a red majority government is not desirable now? How can the parties renew themselves and get rid of the dead weight and find a basis for cooperation--before this fall?

"One can hope that they put some of the criticism to shame and it would be nice if our review in the book of the areas where there are problems could inspire the broad discussion that is needed. But time is very short," said Ralf Pittelkow. "It is problematic that the Social Democrats are pursuing an ostrich policy and refuse to enter into real talks with SF, do not want to investigate the actual possibilities. Until they are sitting with a red majority. And SF has been able to score a lot of cheap points by saying: 'You want to use our votes, but you don't want to talk to us.' People don't understand that. The Social Democrats have a solid tradition of being somewhat arrogant and knowing better than the rest of us and they are not very interested in people involving themselves critically in what the party is doing. It is true that they have changed their style somewhat on the national level, but I think the refusal to talk is being regarded as an extension of the arrogant tradition."

"The seriousness of the situation with regard to SF has not yet become entirely obvious to the Social Democrats. Much of what SF stands for has become a broad trend in Danish politics. And one can say that the SF people are on a level with the Conservatives, especially under Schluter's leadership, when it comes to excelling at communicating some political values and getting an immediate sympathetic response from the public."

Unfortunate Division of Tasks

The two authors referred to a political opinion poll that the Institute for Opinion Analysis conducted in February. One of the questions asked was which party people would vote for as a second choice. Four out of five Social Democrats named SF as their second choice. All in all the survey showed that at least 42 percent of the people are not averse to the idea of voting for SF.

"That should make the Social Democrats in particular stop and think," the two authors said.

One of the things they deal with in the book is what they call the unfortunate division of tasks between the two parties.

Karen Jespersen: "On the one hand you have a party that stands for all the things that involve your emotions--more democracy, equality for women, a better environment, more money for the little people in society--even

more than the Social Democrats are willing to give--and so on. And on the other hand are the thinkers who say: 'We can't afford everything, now we have to stop and think, it doesn't do any good to do this,' etc. We are calling for a combination. Where some of the nice goals that make one's heart beat faster are retained, while at the same time one keeps a cool head and maintains a realistic attitude."

Wild Expectations

What do they think is the most important stumbling block to a successful red majority regime?

"Probably economic policy. A lot has been said about SF becoming realistic lately. The nonsocialists have said, perhaps somewhat tongue in cheek, that the SF people have become more realistic than the Social Democrats. It has been noted, for example, that some of SF's calculations have been taken in for scrutiny by the Finance Ministry, which said the figures are correct. The only problem is that the basic assumptions underlying the calculations are extremely unrealistic. SF proclaims that the poorest members of society should get almost everything in contract negotiations. But if you ask how they intend to stop others from making demands, they have no answer. Should there be a legislative intervention--the only sure method? 'Oh, no!' they say," commented Ralf Pittelkow.

"One should 'take from the rich,' they say. But if the very drastic redistribution that is implicit in SF's economic policy is implemented, people with annual incomes of as little as 150,000 kroner will see a dramatic drop in real wages. They hardly feel rich and probably think they are the ones who should get more money under a red majority," said Karen Jespersen. "All in all there are a lot of paradoxes inherent in the announcements SF makes to the voters."

We pointed out that SF does want responsibility and must know that it will face the moment of truth if a red majority becomes a reality.

"When one has been a protest party for so long, one is probably more inclined to fire off excessive demands--no matter how much one proclaims that one is responsible. After all that has paid off for them in terms of votes," replied Ralf Pittelkow. "The wild expectations that are created will be hard to deal with by a red majority. When they may have to pursue an even stricter economic policy than the present government."

"Now we have said some bad things about SF, but we also had a lot of nice things to say about the party in our book, for it has been responsible for renewal in a lot of areas."

Environment and Tactics

"An important reason why the Social Democrats are standing still to this extent in terms of winning votes is that they have not been able to carry

out the renewal that SF has come to stand for," said Karen Jespersen. "The demand for more local democracy and autonomy, a cleaner environment, the entire women's liberation issue and many other new trends went on outside the Social Democratic Party during the 1970's. These themes attracted many younger voters who have largely stayed with SF because of them. Now that the Social Democrats have started to take up some of them, such as the environment, many people regard it as a tactical move. And in addition, a good many Social Democrats still help to maintain the union career man image."

Questions like EC and NATO will scarcely contribute to idyllic relations in a possible red majority. Even though SF people have recently managed to utter the words without grimacing in disgust.

"It does little good to go on discussing things as if we were living in the 1930's when one could more or less seal the borders. It is old-fashioned to think that the important thing for 90 percent of the people is what is going on here at home. We have to think more and more in European terms," said Ralf Pittelkow. "It is true that some people in SF have started to talk about the need to examine EC cooperation more closely. But the party's official policy in this area is pure shit--if you'll pardon the expression."

While it is hoped that readers will be debating the survival chances of a red majority, the authors of the book will be going on a 10-week study trip in the United States, awarded to Karen Jespersen by President Eisenhower's Memorial Fund.

Nonsocialist Coalition Doomed

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 15 Mar 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen; first paragraph is AKTUELT introduction]

[Text] There is a real prospect that we will have either a Conservative or a Social Democratic minority government.

The days of the four-party nonsocialist government are numbered. The project to restore Denmark's economy has failed.

Thus it is natural to anticipate the formation of a Conservative minority government after the election, central sources in the Conservative section of the government and in the Radical Liberal Party told AKTUELT.

The ruling majority, consisting of the government parties plus the Radical Liberals, has won majority support in the opinion polls only once in the current election period.

According to the opinion polls Schluter can be fairly confident that he can keep going without having a majority against him. But the positive majority on his side will include the Progressive Party and that, according to

leading Conservative and Radical politicians, makes it very unrealistic to think that the four-party coalition government can continue in the long run.

Liberals in a Bind

These prospects, which are obvious to the central actors on the political stage, are currently having an effect on the debate at Christiansborg.

The Liberals have found it necessary to advance clear special standpoints on economic policy, although for once the people involved were not Svend Heiselberg and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who have previously played the part of "bad boys." No, this time the party chairman himself, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, had to bring the matter up on TV and in BORSEN after his increasingly strongly-placed rival, group chairman Ivar Hansen, started the ball rolling in B.T.

The Liberal offensive was greeted with tolerant shrugs by their Conservative government colleagues:

"The Liberals are now asking for even more cuts in the public sector and more privatization," said one Conservative minister.

"But in the 4 1/2 years this government has been in office, two Conservative ministers have implemented the biggest and most painful cuts in the public sector, namely former Social Affairs Minister Palle Simonsen and former Labor Minister Grethe Fenger Moller. The Conservatives have never opposed Liberal proposals involving savings cuts and have never encountered privatization demands that have been turned down."

But the Conservatives realize that the Liberals are being "unreasonable" now because they are in a bind. The Liberals' prominent and not very flattering role in the approaching farm crisis is a big embarrassment to the party. And the prospect of a Conservative solo number after the election makes it vital for the party to presents its very own message on economic policy now that the fiasco of the recovery policy is becoming obvious.

In the face of these maneuvers the Conservative inner circle is keeping a stiff upper lip and waiting things out.

Conservatives Want to Wait Until Fall

The Liberals are eager for an election before the summer vacation period, for reasons that are explained in detail in a later article. But the Conservatives would clearly prefer to wait until fall.

The fifth anniversary of the formation of the four-party government is a magic date for the prime minister, according to his closest advisers. When Schluter has passed that date as head of the four-party coalition he will have led the most tenacious government constellation in decades. His image will reflect what he and his advisers are now striving for above all else: stability.

"Therefore it is annoying that there are many signs that this stability will end with the next parliamentary election, whether we have a red cabinet or a nonsocialist majority with the Progressive Party," said a Conservative minister in a central position.

"Neither could survive very long. And that will be the end of stability at a time when economic developments make it most necessary."

New Constellation Needed

The minister acknowledged with a smile that this reasoning leads to the thought that a new constellation must be sought that can preserve the stability and energy the next government will need in a period of economic chaos.

But the Conservatives cannot "shove" the Liberals out of the government. It is important to create a situation where it looks as if the Conservatives are reluctantly compelled to abandon the four-party fellowship. That means that Schluter will have to continue with the present government unless he has a clear (socialist) majority opposing him. The transition to a middle-seeking Conservative minority government cannot take place until there is a parliamentary crisis, but if Glistrup is back in Folketing, we will not have to wait long for one to occur.

This kind of crisis could force the four-party coalition to resign--with or without calling a new election. And when the new government is being formed the Radicals can make their continued support for Schluter contingent on his forming a government that is able to cooperate.

Radicals and Environment

In recent days the Radicals have provocatively fueled the smoldering disagreement among the government parties. The party feels it has strengthened its profile on environmental issues and finance policy spokesman Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen has followed this up with a strong demand for negotiations in May on public investments and the 1988 budget.

Behind the Radical offensive lies a realization that the environmental resolution Folketing passed in November on the basis of a proposal made by Lone Dybkjaer is wildly unrealistic. Cutting toxic emissions in half in 3 years simply cannot be done for technical and economic reasons. During the negotiations that must now be carried out by the Folketing Environmental Committee, they will be forced to change the time framework of the plan from 3 to 5 years.

To prevent this from being regarded as a definite lowering of the Radical environmental profile, a demand emerged for a tax on artificial fertilizer. But at the same time the tax is placed years in the future, well beyond the election, so the government can live with its being mentioned in the resolution and the committee report without having to put it into effect for the time being. On 1 May the Environmental Committee will be finished and

then the big environmental conflict will have reached a preliminary conclusion. Apparently Bilgrav-Nielsen intended the latest offensive against public and semipublic investment programs to insure that the moderated investment plan for the environment that the committee will come up with on 1 May will also remain unchanged by these investment policy priorities.

Economic Policy Fiasco

Although this could suggest that the environmental policy battle may end without leaving deep scars on any of the participants, the Radicals are clearly in a bind because of the economic policy fiasco. Niels Helveg Petersen has invested all his personal prestige in close teamwork with Schluter, based on sharp criticism of the Social Democrats, especially Anker Jorgensen, for having failed to live up to their responsibility with regard to economic balance. Thus the fact that it now appears that the Conservative-led government is doing no better is a serious embarrassment to the Radical Liberal Party's leader.

In the short run though this binds Helveg and the Radicals even more closely to the Conservative prime minister. And even Helveg's Radical critics see no chance of a cooperation with the Social Democrats as long as Anker Jorgensen is party leader.

Middle-Seeking Moves by Social Democrats

It has been noted that former Tax Minister Mogens Lykketoft, the Radicals' favorite Social Democrats, and the now official party crown prince, Svend Auken, have recently expressed views intended to appeal to the middle spectrum of Danish politics.

They have categorically supported the Conservative government's fixed exchange rate policy, thus rejecting the devaluation policy that the Danish Social Democrats pursued in the late 1970's and that the Swedish Social Democrats have had such striking success with.

This has delighted Helveg and Schluter, who are currently under pressure from the experts to carry out a Danish devaluation, citing the Swedish example, among other things. (Thus on Friday BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN reported that three out of the five economics professors the paper consulted were in favor of this recommendation.)

At the same time Lykketoft, Auken and Anker Jorgensen are now talking about a Social Democratic minority government, instead of the SDP-SF government the Social Democrats themselves put on the agenda earlier.

But in the government parties as well as the Radical Liberal Party the "new orientation" of the Social Democrats is regarded as largely a campaign maneuver. It is clear that the Social Democrats must win support from the middle group of the electorate in order to win a majority. It is another matter that if an SDP-SF majority is created, the Social Democrats will be forced to try and use it.

Strategic Nightmare

Today the situation is almost a nightmare for Social Democratic strategists. One of them described it like this: "I imagine that we have an SDP-SF majority and that we are forced to implement a 20 percent devaluation. In the process of passing the tough legislation with the tight labor controls necessitated by this kind of devaluation, the cooperation breaks down and the nonsocialists return to power. We have then done the dirty work and been rewarded with a defeat, the same thing that happened in 1982, and Schluter can continue in office for the next 10 years."

It may be some consolation to the Social Democrats that the opinion polls have shown an SDP-SF majority as seldom as they have shown majority support for the current ruling constellation.

'Chaos' If Party in Folketing

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 15 Mar 87 p 12

[Text] If Seamen's Union chairman Preben Moller Hansen succeeds in mobilizing enough stay-at-home voters he can get into Folketing and contribute to a double parliamentary chaos, in the estimation of election expert Jorgen Goul Andersen.

"But personally I doubt that he will get over the cutoff barrier," the election researcher said. "The Seamen's Union chairman is currently having a hard time getting enough signatures to register the party."

And in the 1984 municipal elections his party, Common Course, had notably poor results in Copenhagen and Esbjerg where the party has a strong organizational base.

So far Common Course has not shown up on the opinion poll scoreboards.

"It is conceivable that Moller Hansen can attract some of the Progressive voters. But even though some Progressive voters would undoubtedly be inclined to go in the direction of rabid leftist viewpoints, there would not be many of them," Goul Andersen told AKTUELT.

Apathetic Leftist Voters

"I do not think he can win over the remaining Communist voters. These are people who have grown together with the party and they cannot be shaken. And I doubt that he can get many of the intellectual Left-Socialist votes either. This leaves the apathetic left-wing voters and here he has a chance. But I don't think he can collect enough of them. This is also a question of the general trend in party patterns. While it was incredibly easy for a new party to make a breakthrough in 1973, no new party has succeeded recently. New party formations have done extremely poorly.

"But if he gets in he could tip the entire balance. He and his party comrades are probably the only people who would want a labor majority made up of the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party and Common Course.

"One can easily imagine a 50-50 election result with only a few votes separating the two big blocs. And with Preben Moller Hansen on one side and Glistrup on the other, making Folketing totally unmanageable. Of course that would push things toward a government in the middle," said Goul Andersen.

One of the big uncertain factors in evaluating the seaman's chances is the question of how much attention he can get from the media. It is a clear plus for his chances here that EKSTRA BLADET has backed his Folketing candidacy in an editorial commentary and news reports.

Liberal Leaders Squeeze Farmers

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 15 Mar 87 p 13

[Text] The Liberal Party is in a very serious political bind. Unless the party succeeds in precipitating an election soon, it could find itself in the fall with three prominent representatives of the economic pincer movement that is currently threatening to squeeze Danish farmers, the Liberal Party's core voters.

In the period from 1 July to 1 January EC's highest body, the Council of Ministers, will have a Danish chairman, namely none other than Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, chairman of the Liberal Party. During this period the Council of Ministers will be responsible for decisions that will be especially unpleasant for Danish agriculture.

EC's costly agricultural policy is quite untenable and changes are needed to limit the skyrocketing costs. The stockpiles of surplus products are a visible indication of a perverted agricultural policy that has led to considerable popular resentment.

While Ellemann-Jensen will be the top political figure in this reform that will squeeze Danish farmers economically, his predecessor as Liberal chairman, Henning Christophersen, will be the top figure in the civil service bureaucracy implementing the anti-farm decisions. As EC finance minister, Commissioner Christophersen will play a major role in the reorganization of farm subsidies.

Thankless Role for Britta

Finally the maladroit minister of agriculture, Britta Schall-Holberg, will be responsible for implementing the EC dictates in this country and at the negotiating table in Brussels--to the extent that she is able to participate--she will be forced to passively accept the cuts whose soundness neither she nor anyone else in the party can seriously dispute. She and the

party chairman have been assigned an equally thankless task in the environmental policy dispute. The party lacks credibility because it has acted as the extended arm of agriculture to such an extent. Today the farmers must find the forces that can moderate the wildest ambitions in the environmental area outside the Liberal Party.

The picture of the three top Liberal politicians leading the massacre of Danish agriculture is a nightmare to prominent Liberals and it is a major reason for their desire to have an election in June.

But there are many other reasons. A Liberal politician listed four more:

1. Regardless of the substance of EC policy, an election campaign would be inexpedient during the Danish chairmanship period. The foreign minister, who is the chairman of the Liberal Party, will be under a heavy burden of EC work and he will not have enough time to act on the domestic scene.
2. Economic considerations. All the economic indicators are pointing the wrong way and an intervention is needed. Not a traditional austerity move with limits on consumption but a concentrated effort to improve competitiveness and strengthen the private sector. But it is not realistic to do this before an election. And it is urgent.
3. A more general consideration concerns the political work that has bogged down for some time in the shadow of the campaign. Folketing is wasting time. No serious negotiation results can be achieved in a situation where everyone is getting ready for an election.
4. And budget considerations are especially important. The government will submit its budget proposal in August. The Liberals feel there is a need for a dramatic tightening up of public spending, but a budget proposal that forms the basis for the campaign of the four government parties will be just the opposite of that.

"It would be the world's most expensive budget," the Liberal source said.

Liberals Court Farm Vote

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 17 Mar 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Spring Maneuvers"]

[Text] Even though Prime Minister Poul Schluter insists that the government does not want an election before fall and the Social Democrats officially want an election as soon as possible, the behavior of the parties seems to indicate the opposite. The government parties are squabbling among themselves as if the campaign was just around the corner. While the Social Democrats, instead of going on the offensive and choosing their words carefully, are talking nonsense about an SDP-SF government alternative. One can see this—but not understand it—in newspaper interviews with Anker Jorgensen, Svend Auken and Mogens Camre in the past week.

Last week the chairman of the Liberal Party, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, took time off from the Thule radar issue, the missile debate, EC and other foreign ministerial concerns in order to look after his party's liberal profile on the domestic front. This was part of Ellemann's solemn promise that he will now involve himself more actively in the domestic political debate.

That this was not just a routine move on the part of the Liberal chairman is apparent from his statements, which can be interpreted as being unusually critical of the government. Seconded by Liberal group chairman Ivar Hansen, the party chairman declared his unconditional opposition to a fertilizer tax as part of the plan of action for the marine environment. Ellemann made it clear at the same time that the Liberals view the big public sector as a major problem for the Danish economy. The Liberals want to go back to the origins of the recovery policy designed by Henning Christophersen, which included cuts, increased user fees and privatization of public services.

The Liberals feel that essential parts of the government's economic policy were destroyed when Conservative Palle Simonsen took over as finance minister in the fall of 1984. Although it is hard for the Liberals to reproach their Conservative government colleagues for the fact that Christophersen left his post as minister early in favor of mammon in Brussels. But it is true that Palle Simonsen--on the basis of a realistic awareness of inadequate parliamentary possibilities--pushed the privatization question into the background. And when Henning Dyremose stepped in as labor minister a year ago, another special Liberal issue was laid to rest, a reform of compensation funds in which members' payments to unemployment funds would be adjusted to unemployment and depend on the risk of unemployment in individual job groups.

The Liberals now want this resurrected as well.

Uffe Ellemann's activity can be viewed as an indication that the Liberals have an overwhelming need to let off steam to relieve the pressure of mounting frustration over the government's lack of obvious results. Although one can discuss whether the economy has gone up or down during the lifetime of the four-leaf-clover coalition, it is a definite fact that the government has not been able to meet its own goal: The key to improving the balance of payments deficit has not been found--or the consequences are so alarming that no one has dared to use it. The optimism that buoyed the government in the first years has worn off. And above all, society is in almost exactly the same place, as far as both the good and the bad aspects are concerned, as it was when the Social Democrats left office in 1982.

In the near future the Liberals may also be forced to cooperate on a series of brutal and unpopular measures aimed at the party's core farm voters. Not only because of environmental plans, but as a result of production adjustments and structural changes in EC.

Perhaps the Liberals find it convenient in the present situation to blame the Conservative ministers for the lack of economic results. But the

Liberals surely do not think it would be better for nonsocialist Denmark if the government falls because of internal disagreement. The party's strategy is based more on jumping off the government train and allowing the Conservatives to do the heavy work alone.

For it is quite clear that a majority cannot be created within the framework of the four-party government to support the changes the Liberals want. The Christian People's Party, which has been hard at work polishing up its own profile in a desperate attempt to keep on the right side of the cutoff barrier, joined the Center-Democrats in announcing its opposition to cuts in the public sector. And the Christians are apparently determined that no more concessions will be made to the Liberals in the environmental area.

At the same time the handsome election offering the government was hoping for seems to be an increasingly elusive dream. There is no sign of a marked decline in the balance of payments deficit or any indication that a united government, seconded by the Radical Liberals, can stand behind a budget proposal for 1988 with continued zero growth in state spending. At the moment it seems impossible that the government parties can agree among themselves on which priorities to set when it comes to the environment, the hybrid network and the Great Belt bridge. And things really get bad when the Radicals join in the chorus with demands for additional billions in aid to education and a stagnant defense budget.

The question of what will follow the four-leaf-clover coalition is an urgent one under any circumstances. The opinion polls indicate that the Christian People's Party will not be represented in Folketing when the next government is being formed. This will leave a bedraggled three-leaf clover that must depend on the Progressive Party.

The choice could easily lie between a Conservative or a Social Democratic minority government. The Liberals must be somewhat concerned about which side of the scales to add their lot to in a situation like that. Or about whether Niels Helveg Petersen will grasp the nettle himself in that case.

With their usual sense for prolonged drama, the Radicals are unlikely to answer this question before the election results are in.

6578

CSO: 3613/59

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY CHIEF ATTACKED BY LEFT FOR WOOLING SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Morten Larsen]

[Text] Gert Petersen is attacked for acting against a decision by the executive committee in making advance statements on the demands of the Socialist People's Party with a view to a cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party. The left-wing faction is convening a conference to organize the opposition but is being criticized for doing so by fellow party members.

The left wing of the Socialist People's Party is now attacking Gert Petersen, chairman of the party, for violating a demand on the part of the executive committee of the party in revealing the policy of the party in an attempt to find political common denominators which may form the basis for a future coalition, if any, of the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party.

The irritation has reached such high levels that members of nine party groups in Jutland and the metropolitan area have convened a conference to be held in Århus on 11 and 12 April to discuss ways of preventing the Socialist People's Party from agreeing to proposals regarding the party's fundamental political standpoints.

The conference will be held one month prior to the national congress of the Socialist People's Party, where it will take a position on the party's demands with a view to a future government cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party. The executive committee has prepared a proposal for the demands and, at the same time, decided that the party must not discuss in public possibilities of compromise in relation to the Social Democratic Party as long as the Social Democratic Party declines to negotiate a cooperation.

The stumbling stone is the statement made by Gert Petersen in the weekly of the Socialist People's Party, SOCIALISTISK WEEKEND, that the Socialist People's Party may be able to abandon its demand for a 10 percent cut in the defense expenditures if the Social Democratic Party will agree to Denmark's withdrawal from the NATO nuclear planning group and Denmark's termination of the agreements on military reinforcements to the country.

That statement weakens the negotiating position of the Socialist People's Party and creates confusion outside and irritation within the party, says Søren Kirk Christiansen, a journalist in Århus, who was one of those taking the initiative for the conference. He is a member of the joint board of party groups in Århus which has often made its position known within the left wing of the party.

That viewpoint is widely held within the left wing of the Socialist People's Party and, as far as BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has learned, is represented both within the executive committee and the Folketing group. But there is no enthusiasm as to the conference.

It is regarded as an attempt to form factions, which are not needed.

"We have a very open party, where we can talk about things, and we have ample possibilities both in our daily work and at the national congress next May of ensuring these things," says one of the representatives of the left wing within the executive committee, Chr. Bundgaard, Århus.

Gert Petersen declines to comment on the situation.

The chairman of the Folketing group, Ebba Strange, disagrees with the criticism and finds it "alarming" that the opponents are calling conferences outside the normal organization of the Socialist People's Party.

7262

CSO: 3613/70

ATASSUT, SIUMUT LEADERS EXCHANGE CHARGES IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Atassut States Price for Cooperation

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 18 Mar 87 p 13

[Text] "It is the second time in the course of 3 years that we shall have an election, and the reason is that Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit cannot cooperate. But things are different, as far as our party is concerned. Atassut is the only party willing to cooperate and the only alternative for the creation of stable political conditions in Greenland," Otto Steenholdt, chairman of Atassut, said at a press meeting following the definitive collapse of the negotiations between Siumut and Atassut on the solution of the government crisis.

Otto Steenholdt finds it very deplorable that an election is the only solution right now, considering the extremely serious nature of the economic situation. But Siumut is not willing to give in and wants to govern the country on its own as a minority government. And in view of the current situation, Atassut dares not leave the responsibility to a single party.

On account of the negotiations on the government crisis, the opening of the Greenland parliament, scheduled to take place on 10 March, was postponed by one day. But when the opening took place and the issue of writs for an election was unavoidable, Otto Steenholdt proposed as the absolutely final way-out that Atassut and Siumut try to get together again, because an election costs a lot of money and will mean that many ongoing project, including the housing construction project, will have to be halted.

Siumut agreed to the proposal, but, as is well-known, the negotiations ended without any results.

Only Committee Posts

Otherwise, Atassut has relaxed its demands. The party started by demanding that the two large parties, with an equal number of seats in the Greenland parliament, share the Greenland government posts and the committee posts. But Siumut does not want to hear of that.

As its final attempt, Atassut states that the party will be content with the two government posts which have previously belonged to the small party IA. Siumut does not want to agree to that either and is only willing to offer Atassut chairman posts in the budget committee and the licensing committee as well as a seat in the Joint Council.

But Otto Steenholdt cannot support the Siumut minority government on those conditions--without any responsibility whatever, as he puts it himself. For the budget has already been adopted and the licenses distributed.

Attempt not Abandoned

Otto Steenholdt has altogether shown a very conciliatory attitude toward Siumut during the negotiations to solve the government crisis. And he has not yet abandoned the hope that Atassut and Siumut will one day get together to form a coalition government as equal parties.

The chairman of Atassut even supported the chief of Siumut, stating in a television crossfire broadcast that Jonathan as prime minister was entitled to fire a disobedient minister. For that is done in other countries in similar cases.

When it comes to it, Otto and Jonathan are closer than is generally believed. But is Jonathan's support the left-wing forces in Siumut, which oppose the cooperation with Atassut, as claimed by Jan Streit Christoffersen of Atassut in a radio broadcast with the top people of the parties.

Motzfeldt Cool Toward Cooperation

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 18 Mar 87 p 15

[Text] "We in Siumut have made very large concessions to establish a cooperation with Atassut. We have thus offered Atassut the chairmanship and the majority in the budget committee. But these offers were rejected. We have offered the chairmanship of the licensing committee. That was also rejected. In addition, we have offered a seat in the Joint Council. Atassut does not want to accept that. Atassut is only interested in seats in the government. Atassut thus misses its opportunity. After a testing period of about 12 months we might have been able to establish a closer cooperation. But the possibilities for that have been missed, and that is deplorable," says Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt.

Must not Become a Precedent

Jonathan Motzfeldt goes on to say that one cannot accept that a minister criticizes the government chief for having neglected his responsibility. The fact that such insults are accepted by the government must not become a precedent. For that is not done in other democratic assemblies.

Confidence is a necessary basis in any political cooperation. When things do not go right for the leftist parties, it is usually their own fault.

One sees that in Denmark and in other countries. The confidence in Siumut and the IA cooperation has been destroyed, and the only way to solve the confidence crisis is to have a premature election.

There have been many articles and much talk about the Thuleradar, but Siumut does not want an election on that issue. And after the election the party wants to see if there are possibilities for cooperation.

"I want to thank for the negotiations that have come to an end. In Siumut we made sincere attempts to form a minority government. But we did not succeed. Some people may find that an election at the present time is quite unnecessary. We find it necessary," says the prime minister.

He thanked for the work of the parliament and for the three years of cooperation with IA in parliament. He finally wished the members of parliament a good trip, expressing the hope of productive talks after the election.

Paper on Election Outlook

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 18 Mar 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Cooperation--But How?"]

[Text] All of the parties are now entering the election period, advocating cooperation. However, achieving the much desired cooperation will become extremely difficult. We got a clear impression of this during the dramatic days preceding the unavoidable decision to issue writs for an election. The adults behaved like children, as it is put in Greenlandish.

It is quite clear that none of the parties will achieve the majority in this election, and they therefore have to seek the support of one another. Will IA again assume the role of the puppet, telling its big brother: "You may start pulling the strings again, throwing us out when it suits you."

And what will be the reaction of Siumut? Will the party say: "Dear Friends, we shall not be able to govern without you. We therefore want to forgive you. Let us start anew."

Or will IA be given the cold shoulder with the message: "It is the second time that you have ruined the work of Siumut. You have caused our party to lose its credibility, and we cannot live with that!"

But what are the possibilities of a cooperation between Atassut and Siumut? It probably is not very likely. Siumut makes a testing period of 12 months the condition for such cooperation, and Atassut says that Siumut only wants to cooperate on its own conditions.

Nobody will be surprised if the voters are undecided. But who will benefit by their indecision? Will the left-wing forces be given another chance

after this collapse, which in 4 years has caused the country to have two premature elections? Or is one to believe in Otto Steenholdt? He says: Atassut is the only party willing to cooperate and the only alternative for the creation of stable conditions.

The possibility that the left-wing forces will then be given the opportunity of taking control should not be ruled out. Issittup partiia is now nominating candidates for the election, and that party is the result of dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by Siumut. Both Atassut and the new party oppose the present economic policy and the large alcohol consumption.

But will they get the majority jointly, and will they be able to get together?

Siumut and IA, no doubt, will get together again once the air has been cleansed, as Arqaluk puts it. But how many candidates will they get jointly?

At present, one has to agree with Storm P. that it is particularly difficult to predict the future. But it is probably reasonable to expect the party which has cut the best figure in the recent unproductive negotiations to obtain most of the votes. And it will be up to the voters themselves to find out which party that is.

7262

CSO: 3613/70

U.S. SEEN PROVIDING 'LIFEJACKET' ARGUMENTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 Feb 87 p 19

[Text] Washington, (Special Correspondent): The recent statements on the Cyprus issue in the U.S. Congress by Secretary of Defense, Weinberger which did not differ at all from those made by the State Department a month ago, have rendered, according to political and diplomatic observers in Washington, a true service to the Greek government, which is currently facing serious internal problems.

Mr Weinberger's statements constituted a "political life jacket" for the Greek prime minister, who snatched the opportunity to divert public opinion, to other issues even if temporarily.

The Washington observers make clear that Mr. Papandreou's "explosion" was dictated by domestic causes, by indicating that Mr. Weinberger's statement on the Cyprus issue was within the "legal framework" which was extensively explained in a recent letter by the State Department to members of Congress whose existence Athens of course was apprised of, but on which it kept a prudent silence at the time.

Spectacular Retreat

Moreover, according to the same political observers, the equally spectacular retreat of Mr. Papandreou's government--a result of the supposedly satisfactory American explanations which were shown as "providing a justification for the Greek reaction" supports the thesis according to which Mr. Papandreou's aim was to impress public opinion.

According to American analysts, as the economic problems deteriorate, Mr. Papandreou will continue to an ever increasing degree, "lesser issues" of foreign policy, especially those concerning the United States, for domestic consumption.

Certain analysts, furthermore, who "guage" the degree of the attempted impression upon the average voter by the reaction to the Weinberger statements combined with the noise around the Prinos issue and the pro-Soviet statements of Mr. Papandreou, have begun to think that the elections "are much closer than one would imagine".

Preplanned Reactions

In order to help us appreciate the degree of purported political exploitation involved, the well-informed sources offer the true picture of the "reactions" to the Weinberger statements and indicate:

First of all, the American Ambassador, Mr. R. Keeley "was not summoned" to the ministry of foreign affairs, as the Greek government insisted it was the case, but had personally asked for a meeting with Mr. Kapsis "on another matter" and with this opportunity, the Greek deputy minister expressed the Greek "displeasure" in connection with the Weinberger statements.

Secondly, the artfully promulgated version, according to which Mr Kharalambopoulos's visit was postponed in reaction to the Weinberger statements, proves to be "inexact," given that the Greek side had informed America about the postponement prior to being appraised of the Weinberger statements. Hence, one must "seek the reason for the postponement elsewhere."

Thirdly, while the government, on the surface was trying to convey the impression of "clouds" in Greek-American relations by arousing the nationalistic sentiment of the people, it was promoting at the very same time unobstructedly the evolution of the various issues in Greek-American relations, having thus fully applied the policy that is both dear and familiar to Mr. Papandreou, i.e. the policy of "double talk".

Finally, according to political observers, within this framework the speedy retreat of the Greek side was very natural, it having obviously realized in the past that any such "maneuvering" costs a lot in terms of negotiating power, decided to sail back into the "calm waters" of Greek-American relations.

13373/9190
CSO: 3521/90

REPORTED ULTERIOR MOTIVES OF PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER CONFRONTATION

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 6-12 Feb 87 pp 13-14

[Text] Only a few meters separate the office of the president of the Republic from the Maximou mansion, where Mr. Papandreou has his office. However, this short distance is covered with lesser and lesser frequency by the prime minister on his way to bring the President of the Republic up to date in consonance with the constitution.

There remain fewer doubts today, that a clash exists between these two men, which they do not even try to conceal. Our political editor reports the following on these developments:

What is going on in the constitutional pinnacle of our state? What is the purpose of all this blatant attack on the president by the government? What does the prime minister think? And even more important: what is the ulterior motive of this open confrontation?

These queries, while they do not constitute still another revival of the presidential issue, do, however, take first place in political discussions, because of the revelations that a guerrilla warfare is going on between the Maximou mansion and the presidential office on Herodou Atticou street. The souring of the relations between the president and the prime-minister, which was in the making for some time now, has assumed a new dramatic dimension with the manifested disagreement on the Khristos Roussos issue. It would be both farfetched and by all means erroneous to consider that the main reason of their clash was the president's refusal to mitigate the sentence of that criminal who had been given a life sentence. However, it was the overall handling of the case that startled the observers.

As it was natural, this case did not close following the meeting of the president and the prime minister. On the contrary, the difference of opinion was painted sharper and deeper by the pro-government newspapers. According to their reports:

- There exists an open clash between these two elements of public life.
- The clash emanates from the fact that the president of the PASOK has always preferred a "decorative" president for the Republic.

- That both sides possess "secret weapons" which they are ready to use at a given moment in order to strengthen their position.
- That the prime minister is considering the dismissal of the president, (on the basis of procedures foreseen in the constitution of 1975 and its more recent revision).
- That the government is even determined to call early elections in the event the president should resign, etc.

Exchange Of Letters...

As if the above events were not enough, a new revelation (emanating again from the pro-government press) exploded like a bomb:

The president of the Republic addressed a personal letter to the prime minister in which he not only exposes his views, but at the same time protests against his undermining by members of the government via the pro-government press. (It is not known whether he mentions those ministers and deputy ministers involved, explicitly). He asks for the government's support in these unfair attacks and emphasizes that they have not only a personal character but also damage the institution of the Presidency.

Interpretations

As it happens in similar cases, where reaching the heart of the issues involved is not an easy task, diverse interpretations have been lent to the above events.

Certain circles considered the clash in question as a pure show, instigated by the well-known government tactic of disorienting public opinion and diverting the attention from the ever worsening economic and social conditions, especially in view of the ever-increasing wave of strikes. The supporters of this interpretation indicate that the issue has been fomented and further sharpened primarily by those newspapers which are PASOK supporters and which were successful in "inducing" into this game the opposition press as well, a fact which, in any case, is a rather uncommon occurrence.

A quite different interpretation attributes this open clash to a "warning" by Mr. Papandreou to the president that the moment has come for a "change of the guard" in the presidential mansion. Namely, the president of the Pasok has decided to move from the Maximou mansion to the one near-by, and he wishes to prepare the ground by exploiting this clash.

Quite a few observers even emphasized that Mr. Papandreou would not be at all opposed to Mr. Sastzetakis' resignation even now, which would open the door to further political developments, including quite possibly early elections, in the event, for instance, the present Parliament could not elect a new president (due to the parliamentary might of the parties).

The Beginning and the End

Other political observers attributed the dimensions assumed by the clash in question to the idiosyncrasy of the prime minister, more specifically to his perception that he, himself constitutes the beginning and the end of the entire political life of the country, and that the president who, besides, was elected only thanks to Papandreou and by votes generated by Papandreou, has no choice but to obey the latter's orders and decisions.

13373/9190

CSO: 3521/90

NATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN TURKEY

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 13-19 Feb 87 p 24

[Article by Ant. Protonotarios; "A Turns Towards Islam"]

[Excerpts] Recently, cross-checked information from reliable sources mentions a revival of the religious sentiment in Turkey; a fact that has already been a cause of concern among both political and military circles in the country.

It is believed that this new turn of the Turks towards Islam is inspired and guided by Iran, although many believe that the Turks themselves are slowly returning to Islamic principles, which had been loosened since the era of Kemal Ataturk, mainly because the clergy came under political control and was pushed aside.

It is alleged that today there exist in Turkey 3 secret religious organizations known under the names of Naksidenti, Soulemanoi and Nourkou [phonetic spelling] which make every possible effort to revitalize religious zeal and which seem to have achieved already a degree of influence among certain government and party circles.

All three of the organizations named above utilize every means at their disposal in order to recruit even members of the Turkish armed forces, especially among lower rank officers as well as students of military schools. It is a fact that 45 cadets have already been expelled from their respective military academies, and an equal number has been ordered to abandon further instruction. These Islamists have been active even in the schools via the State Planning Organization, where, though a recent ordinance issued by the Ministry of Education, they succeeded in making the attendance of classes of Islamic religion compulsory. It is estimated, according to Turkish press releases, that 1,500,000 students are attending classes on religion, while on the other hand, an attempt to re-instate the "turban" has been condemned by the press as "retrogressive".

In a rally which took place in Istanbul on January 16, 1987, 2 Iranian agents were taken in custody, while 6 more were arrested in various cities of the country's interior. The principal speaker in that rally was Nesmedin Erbakan, a well-known leader of the National Deliverance

Party and former vice-president of the Turkish government, who has been denied any political activity until 1992. In his speech he demanded that the Turkish government reduce the scope and importance of its ties to the West in general and he opposed the Turkish candidacy to join the European Economic Community. The Iranians attempted to recruit amidst the Muslim population of Western Thrace as well, 8 percent of whom are Shi'ites, by offering scholarships to young Muslims to pursue theological studies in Iran. At the present time, when the Turkish-Greek relations are tense, the danger from the East is more than ever palpable, the Turkish occupation of Greek Cyprus continues with parallel menaces and challenges in the Aegean and inflammatory statements by Mr. Ozal, the emerging Islamic revival in this neighboring country contributes an additional element to the future development of our relations with Turkey.

Although it is rather early for prognostications on whether and when the Islamic revival effort in Turkey will achieve any significant momentum,--even if the present Turkish government, whose behind the scene leaders are the military, will not, to be sure, allow lightheartedly the creation of any fait accompli which would jeopardize the present societal structure--it is imperative for us Greeks to increase our vigilance and preparedness.

Can anybody imagine a Turkey made up of 50 or 60 million Muslims at the mercy of the mullahs?

At the present time neither our NATO ties nor our position as a partner in the EEC have been sufficient in inspiring prudence and in checking the animosity and unbridled defiance of our Turkish "allies", who, furthermore aspire to EEC-membership. If a theocratic government were to be established in Ankara and if every element of stability and every pretext of self-control were to disappear, who would be able to come to the aid of tiny Greece? Even as a remote possibility, should not this new emerging menace be for us a matter of concern, shaking us from our lethargy? Parallel to the required vigilance and the mental-, military- and technological preparation of our nation in view of the current great danger from the East, shouldn't we, Greeks, give an absolute priority to new national planning concerning our demographic problem so that the 21st century will not find our country depleted of the human potential capable even from a numeric standpoint to defend the future of our people? For it is certain that a Turkey of 40 million today or 50-60 millions tomorrow, either under a regime of the Evren-type or under a Khomeyni-type regime will never cease to present a menace to the territorial integrity and national independence of Greece. One wonders, how many noticed that the issue of the diminishing population in Greece--although it should be one of primary concern, impacting as it does on the future substance and existence of our very nation--was not given any serious and consequential coverage during the recent parliamentary debates on the issue of national defense?

13373/9190
CSO: 3521/90

BRIEFS

REPORTED AL-QADHDHAFI MEDIATION OFFER--It is a fact: Col al-Qadhdhafi invited the Greek ambassador to Libya into his office and asked him to transmit to Athens his offer to get together in Tripoli both Mr Papandreou and Mr Oza1 in order for them to discuss the Aegean crisis. The offer was transmitted, but was not accepted by Athens. It seems that al-Qadhdhafi continues to feel obligated toward brother Andreas because of that famous meeting at Elounda with Francois Mitterrand about Chad. Let us mention in passing that the Chad crisis is still going on... [Text] [Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 10-16 Apr 87 p 10]

/9716

CSO: 3532/115

PARLIAMENT REJECTS SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY ON NUCLEAR SHIP VISITS

SV Chairman Explains Proposal

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland: "No Legal Ban On Ships With Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The Socialist Left Party (SV) is not getting support from other parties in Parliament for its bill calling for a legal ban against nuclear weapons on ships in Norwegian ports. But the proposal from the foreign relations committee will presumably not be made until after the Labor Party's national convention, even if the deadline falls today.

In October 1985 SV proposed that ships carrying nuclear weapons not be granted access to Norwegian ports. Foreign military vessels should not be able to visit a Norwegian port until stating beforehand that they are not carrying nuclear weapons onboard. Violations would be punishable by a jail term of up to three years.

The Labor Party, the Conservative Party, and the parties of the center agree they will say no to this idea. Accordingly, at today's foreign relations committee meeting, these groups are ready to present the proposal. The major parties emphasize that Parliament is united on this matter.

Bratteli

As far as AFTENPOSTEN can ascertain, reference is made to a draft proposal to a proposal on security and disarmament (Security Proposal number 225). Former prime minister Trygve Bratteli's 21 October 1975 statement in Parliament still remains the most central element.

Bratteli said that there will not be "any legal deviation from the established Norwegian nuclear policy if a foreign warship on a friendly visit to a Norwegian port should be carrying nuclear weapons." At the same time he estimated that the Norwegian condition that foreign warships not have nuclear

weapons onboard would be respected.

"We got the first draft of the proposal on Thursday last week. SV is the only spokesman for the opposition in the Labor Party and No To Nuclear Weapons. We need more than three and a half working days," SV leader Theo Koritzinsky told AFTENPOSTEN.

Some Labor Party Support

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Nuclear-Free Ports: Labor Party and Socialist Left Party In Scuffle"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party (SV) clashed in a major political scuffle yesterday when Parliament took up SV's proposal to ban nuclear weapons on ships visiting Norwegian ports. "The proposal is an enormous hole in the air," said Einar Forde (Labor). His fellow party member Thorbjorn Berntsen said that the proposal would really bring about Norwegian withdrawal from NATO.

After a heated debate, a large majority voted against the SV proposal. But it was supported by Ragnhild Q. Haarstad of the Center Party and Labor Party representatives Turid Birkeland and Ranveig Froiland.

Einar Forde expressed surprise at SV's belief in Soviet statements that their ships do not carry nuclear weapons when they visit. He referred to the submarine which went aground in the Stockholm archipelago and said that it was a good example of what can happen if too much faith is put in Soviet statements. The Labor Party's parliamentary leader made the following comment on the fact that several municipal councils have advocated nuclear-free ports:

"Can anyone really think that the policy we want to conduct here won't be a national policy?" He dismissed SV charges that his party has problems with the so-called Bratteli doctrine. "It is a policy which is consistent. Our line must hold fast," he said.

SV Irritation

Hanna Kvanmo (SV) expressed irritation at Forde's having made fun of SV's belief in Soviet statements of willingness. "At the same time he is saying that NATO ships don't have nuclear weapons onboard when they visit Norwegian ports because we are following the Bratteli doctrine. Does anyone really believe they've left their nuclear weapons behind in Iceland or dropped them in the ocean before they come here?"

Thorbjorn Berntsen said that he was not so stupid as to believe that naval fighting forces leave their bombs behind before they sail into the Oslo Fjord.

"But the basic policy we have is a limit for how long the USA and NATO will

avoid Norway. If we prevent them from coming into our ports, the rubber band snaps. Are we willing to live with the consequence of that? Advocating withdrawal from NATO would be the consequence," said Berntsen, who continued: "I cannot imagine the countries of the alliance will defend Norway if we deny them access to the country. Norwegian withdrawal from NATO is not a constructive contribution to disarmament work. So it's better to try to get Nordic nuclear-free zones and put the issue we're discussing in such a context," Berntsen said.

Hanna Kvanmo replied that, after that speech, Thorbjorn Berntsen would have a hard time traveling about giving talks for No To Nuclear Weapons.

12789

CS0: 3639/39

DECLINING LIBERAL PARTY STRIVING FOR 'GREEN' IMAGE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Ole Johan Nilsen: "The Liberal Party--The Party With the Emergency Brake"]

[Excerpts] Recently, on local trains in the Oslo area, alert train passengers could read the following on a small green sticker next to the emergency brake: "Emergency brake--vote Liberal." This for the time being is the latest element in the package whose aim is to get the old party moving and give it enough momentum so that at the next crossroads--the fall elections--chairman Arne Fjortoft will total up more than 3.1 percent of the votes on the national level. This is the objective he has established to see whether his term of office has begun well or not.

Today the party's national convention opens in Trondheim. It marks the start of this year's electoral fight for the party at the same time it will create life within and contribute towards reconstruction. At its national convention last year the party found itself pretty near bottom but took a good look at itself after its defeat in the 1985 election. The Liberal Party has gone through several years of internal wear and tear, much of it organizational, said the party's reconstruction commission.

Much has been invested in building the party up in the years since and for the first time in many years (!) the party has had a recruitment drive. Thus far this has produced a 20 percent increase in membership.

Test of Strength

The party's big test of strength will of course be the municipal and provincial elections in the fall. The party has 593 seats on municipal councils and 50 representatives on provincial assemblies to protect and hovered on both sides of the 3 percent mark in last year's public opinion surveys. How will the party advance, pick up new seats and push its share of votes over the 3.1 percent it got in the parliamentary election? Besides investing in organizational machinery there is naturally the question of policy--farewell to "No--Liberal" was one of the slogans which the somewhat older guard stolidly pronounced.

Another aid to party growth is being sought in a merger of the Liberal and the

Liberal People's Parties after the 1972 Roros breach. Common lists of the two are now appearing as a first step towards such a merger. The two parties, for example, are sharing lists in Oslo.

Swedish Recipe

An interesting feature of the national convention in Trondheim will be a speech by the leader of the Swedish Liberal Party, Bengt Westerberg. He achieved notable success in the elections in Sweden and may have tempted brothers and sisters in the Norwegian Liberal Party to learn something about how one becomes big. Observers have taken note of how Westerberg assured electoral success by consistently speaking in favor of nonsocialist cooperation. Without it, one result could be said to have shone brightly in the two most recent parliamentary elections when the Norwegian Liberal Party sought its downfall by talking simultaneously both for and against support of a non-socialist government in addition to being neutral towards the review which then took place of the Labor Party's position of power.

Green

The Liberal Party still wants to be known as a green party and in this regard, judging from all appearances, is getting competition from the Socialist Left Party. The Liberal Party has to be given a certain edge here, particularly after the support the party gave the protest action against Dounreay, the British nuclear recovery plant in Scotland. But whether such things are enough to increase the share of votes significantly above today's Gallup results is another matter. Rome was not built or rebuilt in a day.

Cooperate

In this fall's Oslo municipal elections the Liberal and the Liberal People's Parties will run on a common list.

Former Liberal Party chairman Odd Einar Dorum said that there had been a good atmosphere for discussions between the two parties. Merger efforts proceed "bit by bit."

He also said that outside of Oslo there will be common lists in West Agder, Hordaland and North Trondelag. Bergen and Alesund will have similar lists, and contacts about cooperation have been made in Kristiansand South.

With an electoral result like the one in 1983, the common list will produce three representatives. All three said they were proponents of the halt to development decreed by the municipal minister for Oslo and Akershus.

At a press conference, environmental issues and expanded democracy, with direct election of city precinct committees, were the principal issues brought up.

The Oslo Center Party has been interested in the common list but yesterday its application for a place on it was turned down.

12789

CS0: 3639/37

RED ELECTORAL ALLIANCE HOLDS NATIONAL CONVENTION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Alf Seeland: "Red Electoral Alliance: 'Untraditional, But Necessary'"]

[Text] "In the electoral fight we will show that the Red Electoral Alliance is the only untraditional party. We have no other counterpart and for that reason we are a necessity on municipal and provincial councils. In the parliamentary election, on the other hand, we admit that in many places a vote for us is a vote thrown away. This time every vote counts and will determine whether we will consolidate."

So said Aksel Naerstad, Akershus, to AFTENPOSTEN after last weekend's Red Electoral Alliance (RV) national convention had elected him its new leader. As its new vice chairman it elected Arne Meisfjord from Nordland. In its independent position vis-a-vis the Workers Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) this revolutionary party has a style and way of doing work which exists alongside those of the other parties, and this they want to preserve. The party favors confrontation and "revealing" capitalism's biases at the local level. On the national level, RV has 39 locally elected representatives. Many of the seats are marginal and Naerstad will be satisfied if the party consolidates its position. Naerstad himself sits in the Akershus provincial assembly. He warns that from here on in RV will attach greater weight to parliamentary cooperation.

This is new. Up until now RV has stressed the importance of actions outside of parliament in its daily work.

North Norway

District policy was a major topic at the national convention and an eloquent North Norway contingent made an impression by seeing to it, among other things, that half the growth in research and development would be spent on the northern part of the country. In a like move, RV will act to get the Directorate of Fisheries located in North Norway, whereas, following a motion from the contingent, the convention advocated halting oil activity north of the 62nd parallel.

Six-Hour Day

The RV wants a six-hour day and a fight for caring work as a responsibility

for society. This is only possible under socialism. There will be free child care centers for all. Naerstad puts it this way: "All of society rests on women's free labor. Women will continue to be oppressed until this issue is solved by society. Women's liberation is impossible without socialism. Between now and the election we will survey what women's free labor means locally. We are talking about billions of kroner."

Racism

A third major topic in the election is what RV calls state racism, something which gained relevance after the government's decision to reduce the number of people to whom it would grant asylum. It was admitted to AFTENPOSTEN that this is hardly a popular issue, but that there are humanitarian obligations.

In a statement the RV national convention supported Linjegods workers' demand for a 10-kroner per hour raise. "The struggle over wages the transport workers are waging is a spearhead aimed against the zero decision which the Norwegian Employers' Association/Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions alliance has heralded before the spring tariff decision," it said.

50,000 Housing Units

Finally housing policy will be important for the RV in the more central regions. The party is calling for the construction of at least 50,000 new housing units this year and for the National Housing Bank to finance at least 40,000 of them at a 5 percent mortgage rate. The instalment period is to be extended to a full 75 years, the first 10 years being free of instalments.

At the national convention action was taken on lesser issues, but the strong link to the Workers Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) continues. For future consideration will be the issue of whether RV will become a regular party, based on individual membership.

12789

CS0: 3639/37

CONSERVATIVE DAILY CRITICIZES SOCIALIST LEFT CONGRESS EC STAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Somersault Over EC"]

[Text] The Socialist Left Party (SV) is a collection of politicians who can carry out good analyses once in a while only to stumble completely when it comes to the conclusion. Its national congress last weekend was no exception. Delegates rubbed their eyes when prolonged applause broke out at Tora Houg and her solid no to the EC as a cornerstone of SV policy.

What were the reasons? Well, more European independence from the USA, weaker common economic interests, different priorities on security policy, and an EC which is increasingly cooperating on foreign policy issues. The SV wants to work to get Norway to support the trend towards a more independent Europe, and its statement of principles has the following elegant formula: "In an independent Western Europe, socialism as well has better opportunities to develop because the socialist movement has deeper roots in Europe than in the USA."

Together with these interesting observations, the SV's statement of principles concludes that the EC is capitalist and that consequently we should remain outside it. It is difficult to get this to mesh with socialism's opportunities in an "independent" Europe. We thus get the strong impression that the Norwegian form of leftist socialism differs from what kindred spirits on the continent think.

Nor have we ever understood the panicky fear of the transnational on the part of Norwegian leftist socialists. Quite the contrary, binding cooperation across national borders has been a mainstay for socialists since Marx's days, and the SV says it has a lease on true Marxism. SV nevertheless recommends an undefined small-state cooperation between the countries of East and West Europe. This is an ideological somersault out into the void.

We have even less understanding of how Europe is to become more independent of the super powers if this corner of the old world does not combine its strengths on transnational solutions to several of the challenges to society which we face. Now, as in 1972, SV wants "cooperation," but with "autonomy" intact, a national sovereignty which has become increasingly more under-

mined without being replaced with anything else.

For quite some time it has been possible to observe that the left has "re-discovered" Europe. This is due in part to the fact that the EC has recently doubled the number of its members and in part because "big capital" has gotten a strange ring with the current makeup of the EC. And not for nothing is "independence" a catchword. People should have waited so SV could have at least toned down its orthodox point of view on the EC, as, for example, its sister party in Denmark has. Instead we see SV's statement of principles reaching a conclusion which is at odds with the facts and proclaiming a sterile no to EC membership as a "cornerstone" in the party's basic views. We wonder how long this ideological confusion will last.

12789

CS0: 3639/37

BRIEFS

HERRI BATASUNA ELECTORATE--Herri Batasuna may be able to show during the next elections that it possesses a significant electorate outside the Basque country. The government is concerned, because it believes that the Herri Batasuna lists for the European Parliament will receive the votes of radicalized groups such as the students, the Andalusian laborers and the workers of some firms troubled by labor conflicts. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr 87 p 7] /8309

CSO: 3548/72

OZAL RESPONDS TO HURRIYET ARTICLE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 7 Jan 87 p 19

[Report by Muharrem Sarikaya and Mustafa Bagdiken]

[Excerpts] Mersin--Speaking at the expanded Mediterranean regional conference of the Turkish Union of Chambers [TUC], Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said: "No matter what they say or do there is no pessimism among our people. Even people who live on muddy streets are optimistic about Turkey's future." Ozal chided the newspapers with regard to the "turban" issue and said: "Do we have reactionarism in Turkey just because a few girls are covering their heads?" The Prime Minister also harshly criticized an article by HURRIYET columnist Oktay Eksi.

In his speech at the TUC conference at the PTT facilities Ozal also referred to the "turban" controversy. Stating that Turkey is working to attain the level of "contemporary civilization," Ozal said:

"I toured the back streets of Adana. We must find ways of serving those people better. Turkey has people who are living in mud. We did not do that. Nor am I trying to blame previous governments. We have problems before us. We are saying: 'Let us catch up with the West; let us become part of the civilized world.' How are we going to do that? This is the issue we must debate. I see that in the last 3-4 days our papers are preoccupied with the turban issue. What will that do? In other words, will they be able to resolve certain problems? Will we be able to solve the problems of those people living in the mud?

"Is the issue of reactionarism so simple? Is Turkey threatened by reactionarism just because a few girls are covering their heads? Those who talk about freedom and liberty have become the most conservative people in the world with regard to this issue. I support the open discussion of everything in an atmosphere of freedom. Today, YOK [Higher Education Council] is not controlled by the government or the political regime. The political regime is only authorized to submit its budget to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. But the man in the street comes to me, the politician, and not the chairman of YOK, to inquire about this issue. That is where the problem is. If I am a politician, I must give an answer. I must even be able to say: 'You are wrong my friend.' It must be my right to be able to say that. I must also be able to say: 'Your are right.' Unfortunately, these things are missing in Turkey."

Article Criticized in Defense of Freedom of Thought

Ozal later declared that he wants to see "Turkey's problems discussed in a civilized manner." In this connection, he referred to an article by HURRIYET's editor-in-chief Oktay Eksi--which was circulated across the globe by the Reuters news agency--and said:

"But you find out that when the issue comes up for discussion a columnist is able to write: 'The political regime is the source of reactionarism.' He can do this without shame. One is grieved by such ugly articles which do not contain the slightest amount of intelligence. We are saying that the problems must be discussed; when other issues come up leftist or other ideas should also be debated. I am never against that. However, the door is open to them but not to these. If we are using the West as our yardstick, we must note that these issues are freely discussed in the West. If we have aspirations to become Westernized, if we want think by Western standards, we must apply the same standards in this country. If we apply double standards, if we say 'this is our standard on this issue, this is our other standard for that issue,' then we cannot get anywhere in anything. But there is something that we know: Our ordinary citizens know these things very well.

"Our citizens are watching these events closely in deep silence. I can see that too. Hopefully, there will come a time when we will all have a more free environment in our country. That is nothing to be frightened of. Because that will lead to a free environment of civilized debate. It is wrong to turn debates into quarrels. I notice that the articles that are being written have a quarrelsome air. This is what I find most objectionable. One of the faults of the old environment was to divide up the people into factions and make them argue with each other. We do not have such a thing. There is nothing to argue about. When one of our columnists (meaning Oktay Eksi) says 'the political regime is the source of reactionarism,' that means that he is looking for a fight. We do not wish to engage in a fight."

Noting that YOK is not controlled by the government and that this is explicitly stated in the Constitution, Ozal said that his government only "advises YOK." The Prime Minister added that he is "opposed to the exaggeration of the problems."

9588
CSO: 3554/166

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT EXPRESSES FEAR OF KHOMEYNI INFLUENCE

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 6 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Bekir Coskun: "Touch the Button Rustu"]

[Text] Take notice of the following words of Rustu Sardag:

"Khomeyni has made an attempt on Turkey The banner for a theocracy has been unfurled Parliament should take matters in hand"

Rustu Sardag is a close friend of Evren's He often goes to the presidential mansion to have private talks. . . . The disclosure that Evren "is not committed to an inflexible position on political bans [on former leaders]" was also made by Rustu Sardag at a press conference at the Turkish Grand National Assembly

While Sardag articulates these things, the impressions he bases them on have been obtained from the mansion

Sardag has no official connection with the mansion But he wears an aura of "consultant-mouthpiece" that derives from a close friendship

Remote controlled

Just like "Touch the button Rustu . . ." in the television commercials [on Turkish television for the Vestel Ferguson TV sets]

Touch the button, and let Rustu tell

"Khomeyni has made an attempt on Turkey

It is true that the mansion has serious worries

A paragraph in the New Year message by Evren has been described as "an ultimatum".

This is what Evren has said in the message:

"The circles keen to take our people back to the old days once again and thus to reap profits for themselves will, as always, find themselves up against the laws of the republic and the Ataturkist forces of this nation"

The laws of the Republic standing in the way of "those who want to take the country back to the old days" is something natural, but what is this about "Ataturkist forces" . . . ?

"Ataturkist Forces . . . ?

The mansion is unhappy with Ozal's blithe indifference in the face of reaction The prime minister's failure to act against reaction with the powers of the state at his disposal disturbs Cankaya [The Presidency].

Could it be that this was the reason why the expression "Ataturkist forces" was used in place of "the forces of the state . . . ?"

And which are the "ataturkist forces . . . ?

The demand by Kececizade Mehmet Efendi for a religious edict on the subject of turbans [worn by some female university students for religious reasons] is no doubt merely one link in a long chain

There is talk of tens of thousands of video and audio recordings smuggled into southeastern and eastern Anatolia from Iran

There is talk of religious trusts, hostels, courses with clandestine goals and money that is flowing like water. . . .

Could it be that religious fanatics are now being used as tools to drag us where we were once dragged by students used as tools. . . ?

Shall we once again be saved by "Ataturkist forces? . . . ?

Touch the button, Rustu Let us have a clearer picture

13184/13104

CSO: 3554/182

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT COMPLAINS OF LACK OF FREEDOM

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 7 Feb 87 p 7

[Interview with SDPP deputy Cuneýt Canver by correspondent Yalcin Peksen; date and place not given]

[Text] Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] assembly deputy Cuneýt Canver, one of the most colorful personalities of our recovering political life in the post-12 September period, was our guest this week. Let us admit from the outset that this conversation did not accomplish its goal of showing our readers who are weary of politics some of the nonpolitical aspects of Canver. It appears that Canver--who managed to turn the conversation into politics as successfully as his sallies in the Assembly--has no room in his life for anything except politics.

[Question] Mr Canver you are known for your sharp outbursts in the Assembly. The issues that you have raised are truly interesting and important matters. However, because of these sharp outbursts the public has come to know you as the bad boy of your party and the political scene. Are you really so ill-tempered?

[Answer] No, I am not ill-tempered. The reason is this: Our party, the SDPP, which is made up of people who have come together by coincidence, has only recently begun to move in directions which can be considered the party's own. However, the absence of an identity of views among party members in the past prompted us to engage in certain personal sallies. I never forget, when I first put forward my proposal for an amnesty, Mr Calp, then the leader of the Populist Party, asked me not to submit my amnesty proposal immediately and said that he would respond to my proposal after talking to the President. But I did not have to share what I was going to do with the President. I could not comply with such a rule. As a result, I submitted my proposal despite the wishes of the party. My proposal was debated for a lengthy time. But these private initiatives did not turn into party causes. Of course, I was partly responsible for that, but it was primarily the responsibility of the party organs. Party organs are supposed to encourage parliamentary deputies. But if the deputy has the impresssion that his proposal will be found excessive, and be criticized and opposed, then he will put forward issues without consulting with anyone. That is how we gained the reputation of being ill-tempered.

Profession of Politics

[Question] Mr Canver, do you consider politics a profession?

[Answer] Yes, politics is a profession. Because one cannot engage in it temporarily like a hobby and then withdraw from it. In my opinion it is a profession one practices for life.

[Question] Then let me ask you this: If politics is a profession, then you must have ambitions to advance in this profession. What is your secret ambition?

[Answer] My ambition is of course to make progress toward a certain point through our battles within the party. Naturally, wanting to remain a parliamentary deputy forever would be against the nature of this business. A deputy naturally has his eyes on other affairs of the party. But that happens when he feels he is ready, when he senses that he will not be rejected by the public and at a juncture where debates which may harm the party will not emerge. If I declare myself a candidate for the leadership of the party now, I would serve no purpose other than harming the party. In these days when the SDPP needs unity and integrity, such a move would be considered as an unpleasant step. In sum, I think that a person should not step forward until the conditions are right. But one must always have an ambition in his heart.

What is a Good Politician?

[Question] In your opinion, what is a good politician in Turkey's context?

[Answer] I have learned something: Our people are extremely pleased when someone says what they cannot say. Let us say that a citizen is upset with the prime minister. He cannot say what he feels and if he can his voice is not heard. But when someone comes out and criticizes the prime minister along the same lines he had in mind then he is extremely pleased. He says: "This is the kind of man we need." Consequently, a parliamentary deputy's job is to become the voice of the people and to say what the people think but cannot say.

[Question] But then he would be labeled quarrelsome. Just as you have been labeled.

[Answer] A deputy has to appear contentious and quarrelsome--though not in a crude sense--in any case. While it is often claimed that moderate people will in the long run win the most points, we observed in the last by-elections that this not so in practice. For example, the ones who won the most votes were those who spoke most loudly against 12 September. Because the masses have remained silent for a long time. They are waiting for a discharge. Who is going to provide that discharge? The politician has to do it. You cannot say "that is the way I am."

Biggest Problem

[Question] Mr Canver, what are problems confronting a parliamentary deputy?

[Answer] Our biggest problem is that, like our people, we are not free. In other words, we are not free to convey to the public the problems of our people without any pretensions. You have to make sure that everything you say complies with the Constitution and the laws and regulations. Even the slightest mishap causes a major uproar in the parliament. It causes a lot of controversy.

[Question] Then what do you do?

[Answer] Most simply, you cannot talk. For example, a deputy cannot say on the Assembly floor the things a columnist may freely write in his column. Newspapers have published several articles on class unionism. But if you look at the records of the proceedings of the Assembly, you cannot find a single reference to the word "class" from the platform of the Assembly. According to the Assembly there is no such entity as "class." If you utter the word "class," you are engaging in leftism or communism at the minimum. In addition, parliamentary deputies are supposed to have immunity. But there is secret supervision. If you defend human rights, it is immediately considered equivalent to supporting terrorists. For example, a teacher was killed by torture in the East...

[Question] The one that was buried in the backyard of the police station?

Fear and Death

[Answer] Yes, that is the one. If you defend him, it is as if you are defending the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]. If you ask for general amnesty, you are considered to be supporting the hands that fire on Turkish soldiers. If you mention torture, you are told: "Are you referring to the generals of 12 September?" You say "Sahinkaya," therefore you are opposed to the 12 September regime. This situation creates fear, weariness and hopelessness. But reasoning with myself I came to the following conclusion: Fear will not help you postpone your hour of death.

[Question] You have probably been threatened.

[Answer] I am upset more with my colleagues than threats. If someone asked me who the greatest enemy of the SDPP is, I would reply: "It is the SDPP." Nobody has harmed the SDPP more than the SDPP itself. But I think that this is a problem that occurs in the internal dynamics of all parties. All parties are experiencing the same problems. Let me give an example. All the information we received about the secretary general of the Motherland Party [MP], Ekrem Pakdemirli and others came from a member of the MP. In doing that he did not think that he was harming the MP. His only motivation was to discredit his political opponents.

Politics First

[Question] Mr Canver, lately our female entertainers have moved away from soccer stars and have begun to have affairs with parliamentary deputies. We know that you are a decent family man. You have never been involved in these

scandals, but it is likely that there is some interest in you. You are young, handsome and well-known.

[Answer] No, there is no interest. You cannot see me in places frequented by such entertainers. I have no acquaintance with such places. They do not even know me.

[Question] But you are probably the best-known deputy.

[Answer] But I do not participate in that lifestyle. I go to night clubs very rarely. My area of specialty is politics. I also like music. I like movies very much. I watch good movies on videotape. That is all.

[Question] Lastly, are there any new issues you will raise in the Assembly?

[Answer] There are two important issues. But you know how busy the agenda of the Assembly is. I am looking for a vacant spot. One of the two issues I want to bring up for a general floor debate is Turkish-U.S. relations. The reason I want to do this is: What has America--for whom we whitewashed our whore-houses, whom we gave everything and on whom we depend--given us so far? I would like this question answered in positive and negative terms. The second issue is: Turkey is a country of revolutions. So far we have had three--or two-and-a-half--revolutions. What did these revolutions change? What were the rationales for these revolutions? What is the situation today? What has changed? In my opinion, nothing has changed. In fact, things have become worse. Now I ask: Why did we have these revolutions?

Whose Sovereignty?

[Question] But these revolutions cannot be prevented.

[Answer] The least we can do is this: We can educate the masses on this issue. We can make sure that military interventions find no justification in people's consciences. Otherwise, if the Presidency is not civilianized, there will be numerous generals who will want to take that office. We are saying that the presidency should be a civilian office. We try to emulate the United States in every area, but we do not see the democratic aspects of the United States. We saw that in the [television program] "32d Day." The U.S. senator demanded from the Chief of the General Staff to account for arms sales to Iran. Can something like that be done in this country? Can I ask the Chief of the General Staff to account for anything? In addition, do you know that as a parliamentary deputy, I rank 15th in protocol. That is, I rank below the generals. I rank below the Chairman of the Higher Educational Council. And I am the representative of the people. This means that "sovereignty does not belong to the nation unconditionally." That is the question I will pose to the Assembly.

COMMENTARY CALLS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 8 Feb 87 p 9

[Commentary by former Ambassador Nuri Eren: "Turkey Has to Shake Off Ottoman Mentality in Its Foreign Relations"]

[Text] Turkey came away from the Islamic summit conference satisfied. It won positive results on two major issues. Representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] made themselves heard at the conference. In addition, the repression of Muslim Turks in Bulgaria was condemned. Our President, Kenan Evren, won respect with his customary dignified subtlety and his distinguished personality. He also won points by agreeing with general ideas which reflected the general atmosphere of the conference. However, what was the contribution of the conference to the bleeding international problems of the Islamic world? What did it add to Turkey's influence in the world and among Islamic countries?

Why Was the Conference Ineffective?

At a recent gathering of international newspaper publishers in Istanbul, the participants complained that the world press virtually did not mention a conference of nations which constitute one-fourth of the world's population and sovereign states. Even papers like LE MONDE, HERALD TRIBUNE, THE NEW YORK TIMES and FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG—which devote several pages to world events—only mentioned on their back pages that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Hafiz al-Assad shook hands at the conference. Turkey was not even mentioned in name. The response to this criticism was: What did the conference contribute to the resolution of Islamic countries' problems to be of international significance? An American scholar who knows Turkey well and who appreciates Turkey's international role more than we do said: "Only Turkey could perform such a function, but as long as Turkey does not shake off its apologetic, adulatory and generally ambiguous attitude in its relations with the Islamic world and the Arabs—an attitude it has inherited from the weakest period of the Ottoman Empire—it cannot have the influence and respectability it can derive from the current geostrategic situation and its level of development either in the Islamic world or among its neighbors or within NATO. Turkey owes the respect it received at the conference to the distinguished statesmanship of President Evren, not to the Turkish foreign policy posture."

Turkey Is a Country of Significance

Although Turkey is a medium power in terms of industrial and military might, it is a country of global significance by virtue of its geopolitical status backed by a population of 52 million and a well-formed political and infrastructure edifice. It plays a key role in the balance between the East and the West. Therefore, it should take a global posture in a gathering of regional, religious and even tribal states---such as those in the Islamic conference---which have not yet achieved the maturity of a modern nation-state and it must put forward macro-level proposals which may be of global interest with regard to the resolution of problems encountered by the Islamic community. Turkey owes this to its historical heritage and the role it plays today in the balance between the East and the West. That is why it must adjust its role within the Islamic community accordingly. It must attend the gathering of Islamic countries not as a nation seeking self-interest and flattery but as a country which can put forward proposals to help the community attain international significance and influence.

The issues on the agenda of the Islamic Conference Organization are of a nature which are open to Turkey's macro-level approaches. Examples of such problems are the Afghanistan problem, the support of 5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, the repression of Muslim Turks in Bulgaria, the rights of Muslim Turks in Cyprus. When we add to these the restrictions imposed on the building of mosques in France it becomes evident that Muslims are subjected to repression everywhere. A Turkish role to help repressed Muslims is not only acceptable but mandatory in the Islamic Conference Organization. Because that would mean that Turkey is living up to the responsibilities mandated by its strategic place in the world.

Turkey's Stance

Why has Turkey been reluctant to take on such a role so far? Turkey has a general tendency--inherited from World War I and consolidated by World War II--not to interfere in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey has turned to the West for its geostrategic as well as its cultural and economic relationships. The close ties with the West have been seen as an obstacle to the forging of ties with the Arab and Islamic world. Meanwhile, the Arabs--who have been indoctrinated by the West against Turkey for the last 100 years--went beyond being indifferent to this apathy on the part of Turkey and after Ataturk's reforms began to see Turkey as being outside of Islam. When Turkey began to encounter financial difficulties and problems in Cyprus in the 1960's, it turned to the Arab world but its overtures were left unanswered. Instead of trying to find the causes of this cold response and mounting a reconciliation campaign based on the historical roots of Turkish-Arab-Islamic relations, the Turkish governments took the courses they found the easiest: They took an apologetic, adulatory and helpless attitude toward the Arabs.

For 10 years I was closely involved in Middle Eastern affairs as the Chairman of the UN High Commission on Palestinian Refugees. I was in close and remote contact with Arab representatives at all levels. I visited Arab countries twice each year and established a dialog with Arab leaders. During my private talks with Arab leaders I came to sense a subconscious respect and trust for

Turks underneath their complaints that Turkey neglected the Arabs. It is ironic that that confidence stems partly from our turning our backs to the Islamic world for many years. This has created the impression that "the Turks will not harm us." It is in the light of this experience that I see a need for educating the present Arab leadership and the Arab public about the historical significance of Turkey's relations with the Arab and Islamic world.

Arabs Do Not Know Turkey

They do not know anything about Turkish contributions to Islam. They listen with astonishment that Turks form a larger segment of the Islamic world today than even the Arabs. It is a fact that 150 million Muslims of Turkic origin who live in an area extending from China to Yugoslavia and including Iran and Afghanistan constitute a majority in the Islamic world. Moreover, in thinking about Turks, they cannot appreciate that the Turks led Islam from the 9th to the 20th century, that the Turks expanded Islam from Central Asia to the gates of Vienna, that the Turks resisted the Crusaders, that the Turks knocked down the Christian and Latin kingdoms in Damascus and Jerusalem, that the Turks helped the rise of the originally Turkish Timuri and Mamluk civilizations in Egypt and spread Islam to Sudan and Africa and that the Turkish dominance of the Mediterranean ensured the continuity of Islam in North Africa from Morocco to Egypt even though not a single Muslim remained in Spain from the 14th century onward. Although they can see the rare art treasures of the Islamic world now on display in Washington as part of the Suleyman the Magnificent exhibit, they cannot realize that they are Turkish works and that the world's greatest mosques were built by the Turks.

What Could Turkey Have Done?

In the light of these facts, there is no reason dictated by our larger strategic interests to force Turkey to take an apologetic and begging attitude in its relations with the Islamic world and the Arabs. Moreover, treating the problems of the Islamic Conference Organization within a global framework is consistent with Turkey's key role between the East and the West. For example, the liberation of Afghanistan is a global issue. At the Islamic summit conference Turkey could have presented the Afghanistan problem, the status of the Afghan refugees and the Palestinians, the rights of Muslim Turks in Cyprus and the preservation of Islam in Bulgaria as a collective campaign against Islam and could have proposed concrete and practical measures with regard to each of the problems.

It could have proposed the formation of a committee to follow up on the Soviet intention to withdraw from Afghanistan and to monitor the negotiations undertaken for that purpose. It could have proposed that this committee publish the necessary information about the progress of these negotiations and thus to hasten the Russian withdrawal. The allocation of \$4.45 billion for assistance to Afghan refugees from the revenues of Arab countries--which still earn nearly \$200 billion a year despite the fall in oil prices--would be a positive decision. With that money hospitals and schools could be built. Moreover, the 43 nations could offer scholarships to 50,000 young refugees to pursue their higher education in their countries. Turkey could have shown that the anti-Turkish campaign in Bulgaria is the most flagrant of the anti-

Islamic campaigns seen in many countries and could have proposed to the conference the formation of a committee to defend Islam to monitor persecutions against religion which is the most sacred of human rights, to take the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the Helsinki agreement and to act on behalf of the Islamic countries at the UN and the European human rights commissions. The status of the Turkish community in Cyprus could also be represented as a manifestation of an attempt to exterminate a Muslim community. The conference could have resolved to defend the right of the Turkish Cypriot community to have its own administration and could have promised to provide international assistance in the implementation of that decision. The conference could have advised its member countries to expand their relations with the TRNC.

What Results Could Have Been Achieved?

We are in no position to guess how the conference would have responded to these proposals. Judging from the past tendency of the conference to generate more talk than action and its reluctance to approve practical proposals, perhaps no decision would be reached on any of these proposals. However, such proposals would have generated international interest. They would be debated in the world press. The conference would be taken seriously by the world public. Such a situation would not only enhance Turkey's reputation, but would generate serious interest toward the problems of the Bulgarian Turks and the TRNC.

The developments in the Middle East are forcing Turkey to take a more activist approach in its foreign relations. We hope that the positivism claimed by the Ozal government is reflected in our foreign relations and that we shake off the Ottoman legacy of apologizing and ambiguity the American scholar referred to.

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DEMIREL'S VIEW OF SECULARISM ANALYZED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Oktay Eksi: "Secularism and Demirel"]

[Text] Just as we were wishing to God that we would not have to come back to this topic again, we find the topic itself turning on us. This time, it is former prime minister Suleyman Demirel who has revived the issue of "secularism." To be more precise, in an interview with journalist Yalcin Dogan, published in two consecutive issues of CUMHURIYET, he has said things which--coming as they do from a politician who has been the prime minister of this country for a long time--we could not bring ourselves to ignore.

Let us clarify one point first: Having identified himself with the words "I am a republican," Demirel enumerates his beliefs--such as his belief in the supremacy of the law, his support for the state with a social conscience, and so forth--each of which bears debating separately. What is the most important of all, in our view, he says that he is "a Republican in the sense of a secular state."

If it so happens that you are somebody who supports "secularism," you are led to tell yourself "How wonderful So, those who say that Demirel is no better than Turgut Ozal as a secret enemy of secularism are wrong."

That, however, is not the way things are.

You do, in fact, get the point if you read Demirel's words published on 5 January. According to him, it would be wrong in the first place to claim that Ataturk "established a secular republic." More correctly, as the sentence "the religion of the state is Islam" was part of our constitution in the initial years of the republic established in 1923, this is the important thing--in his view. The fact that this sentence was taken out of the constitution and that the principle of "secularism" was incorporated in the constitution in 1937--that is in Ataturk's lifetime--is of no significance or importance whatever.

This is typical Demirel.

Because what suits Demirel's purpose today--even while he says "I am a republican in the sense of a secular state"-- is to pit himself against secularism and to make it, if possible, incomprehensible and destroy it. He does, in fact, begin stating, in response to Yalcin Dogan's questioning, what his concept of secularism is and how secularism can be defined, but at no point does he say that "secularism is the separation of affairs of religion and state" and that "the state whose codes of administration are not based on religion is secular." He turns the issue on its head and, as if he had been asked whether "religion should or should not be kept under pressure in a secular state, he says (given here in summary):

". . . It is necessary to get rid of the expression 'secularism is being violated' when the word religion or religiousness comes up for discussion. I see secularism, in the first place, as lack of pressure on religion, and, in the second place, there are no organized clergymen in Turkey. They are simply not organized It is not possible for them to establish pressure on the state. . . ."

In other words, he evades defining secularism. Instead, he mentioned only one of the facts concerning secularism, that is "the state must not repress religion," making no reference to "the separation of affairs of religion and state" and "a state whose codes of administration are not based on religion."

It is perfectly normal that he should make no such reference. Because Demirel is an admirer of Bediuzzaman Said-i Nursi. In point of fact, the following are the actual words used by Demirel to praise to heaven Said-i Nursi's concept of the state--a concept diametrically opposed to "secularism." Do please read them:

"His Excellency Bediuzzaman has a marvellous statement. He says: 'If our Sultan obeys the commands of our prophet, then he is the khalifa. We too obey him. But he who submits not to the will of the Prophet and engages in oppression, though he may be the Sultan, is a bandit.' There are few things that explains the circumstances of state so beautifully as this." (March 1986, Kopru Dergisi)

As you can see, Demirel is loyal to secularism only to the extent that Said-i Nursi is.

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CHIEF JUSTICES SPEAK ABOUT USE OF 'FATWA'

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 7 Jan 87 p 19

[Kemal Saydamer report]

[Text] Ankara--Higher judiciary organs reacted sharply to Motherland Party deputy leader Mehmet Kececiler's suggestion that the Religious Affairs Chairmanship should issue a "fatwa" [legal opinion] on whether university students can wear turbans and headcovers and that everyone should comply with that decision.

The chief justices of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State took a definitive stance on the issue and said that the fatwa has no place in Ataturk's principles. The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Orhan Onar, stated that he is categorically opposed to the fatwa, while the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Ahmet Cosar, declared that the reform laws are guaranteed by the Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Council of State, Orhan Ozdes, recalled that secularism forms the foundation of Ataturk's principles. The chief justices of the higher judicial organs made the following statements to HURRIYET:

Orhan Onar (Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court): "As the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, I would not want to comment on an issue that may be brought before us in the future. Because the Constitutional Court may have to rule on this issue. However, as a jurist I am categorically opposed to the fatwa. Such a practice does not exist in our laws."

Ahmet Cosar (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals): "Ataturk's principles and reforms constitute a whole. The principle of secularism forms the foundation of these principles and reforms. The reform laws which embody all of Ataturk's principles and reforms are guaranteed by the Constitution. This is how I view this issue. I believe that all practitioners and authorities must view the issue from this perspective. Because the principle of secularism is the republic's indispensable and fundamental ingredient which can lead our nation to civilization."

Orhan Ozdes (Chief Justice of the Council of State): "Secularism forms the foundation of Ataturk's principles. Neither our Constitution nor our laws provide for the institution of the fatwa. When speaking on this subject one must have in mind the Constitution of the Turkish Republic. Like other heads of judiciary organs I am opposed to the fatwa."

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COMPULSORY RELIGION CLASSES BLAMED FOR THREAT TO SECULARISM

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 6 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by İlhan Selçuk: "Should Wear a Turban!..."]

[Text] Turban is a word evolved in France in the 16th century; some say it derives from the Turkish word "tulbent"; it means a headdress that is wrapped around a woman's head to hide her hair from view. African and Asian women use it as part of their tradition, Parisian ladies for reasons of fashion.

To tell the truth, the turban becomes few women; in most cases, it detracts from their beauty. In the Turkey of the 1980's, some of our young ladies at the universities wish to wear the turban as some sort of banner of defiance.

This gives rise to disputes; Cankaya asks for a ban on turbans; Dogramacı, chairman of the Higher Education Council, complies; and the Özal administration adopts an attitude favoring the turban.

To some, the turban is a symbol of [religious] reaction; to others, it is the right under the individual's freedom to wear what one wants.

Meanwhile, the dispute grows by the day; facts keep changing color like shot silk in a breeze; and contradictions in the relationship between right and wrong proliferate endlessly.

A friend asks me:

"Everybody is debating the turban question, but you have not written anything on it; what is your opinion?"

What should I think? . . . Why stop at the turban for the ladies, why not let people be free to wear the fez, let anyone who wishes go around wearing a kavuk [large padded headgear], or the men who wear their own version of turbans What does the turban matter when Atatürk's republic itself has been tampered with, the Uniformity in Education Law has been trampled upon, and reaction has reached the highest echelons of the state?

Democracy in the West was achieved at the end of two long processes. First, there was the struggle for the freedom of conscience, followed by the issue of

freedom of thought. In other words, Western civilization reached its present state as a result of the struggles between science and belief, between rationalism and fanaticism, and this is the base on which modern democracies were established.

The play unfolding in Turkey cannot be accommodated into the time scale of the freedoms in the West

Let us take a look at how the development of secularism, which took hundreds of years in the West, manifests itself in Turkey. The republic was proclaimed in 1923. The Khalifate and the network of Islamic theological schools were abolished in 1924 and a scientific approach to education was adopted. The dervish lodges and cells of recluses were closed down in 1925. Civil marriage was made compulsory and religious marriage was abolished as an institution in 1926. The constitutional article to the effect that the religion of the state was Islam was deleted in 1928. The statement that "The Turkish state is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionary" was written into Article Two of the constitution in 1937. No one can claim that all this was done through the democratic process and by a popular vote.

Some 9 years separate 1937 and 1946. The multiparty system was embarked upon after the country went through the 7 difficult years of World War II. What could secularism mean to the voters when the people, weary of bureaucratic oppression, were composed mainly of the masses who had never been taught what secularism meant?

The state that perceived this fact was America, a country with a wealth of imperialist experience. Britain and American have always been very adept at handling the countries under their influence in collusion with the most retrograde social forces in these countries. Ever since we embarked on our multiparty system, the pro-American parties (that is those who effectively accept America as a power with a mandate over Turkey) have come out as winners at the electoral contests by exploiting religious beliefs.

The army is indeed loyal to one of the Ataturkist revolutions: secularism. But, the National Security Council, armed with the political authority of the Armed Forces on 12 September [1980], did what no civilian administration could have ever dared to do: it introduced compulsory religious instruction in primary and secondary education, thus transforming education into a "two-headed" entity and delivering the most grievous blow to republican principles.

The turban issues is a matter of no consequence within this process. As for the attitude of the "pragmatic" Motherland Party administration, which has occupied the seat of power with the guidance of 12 September, this is also quite clear.

Ozal will do as his predecessors have done by following a policy of "running with the hares and hunting with the hounds": on the one hand, he will wave the sword of Article 163 [of the Turkish penal code which prohibits the

exploitation of religion for political purposes] over the Prosperity Party's head and, on the other, he will covertly pander to reactionaries in quest of the votes of the poverty-stricken Muslim believers of the 1988 elections.

We have seen this kind of motion picture many times before.

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COMMENTARY URGES DISMISSAL OF AMP'S KECECILER

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 87 p 17

[Article by Coskun Kirca: "Get in Line!"]

[Text] Mr Mehmet Kececiler, a man who has somehow risen to the position of deputy leader of the Motherland Party [MP], is reported to have deigned: "It seems to me logical that on a religious issue the ruling should come from the Religious Affairs Chairmanship and that this ruling should be complied with." Mr Kececiler is also reported to have said that these words do not reflect the official view of the MP but his own personal one.

There are in Turkey people who claim that to attempt to destroy the foundations of the national, democratic, secular, and welfare-orientated republic in Turkey should be regarded as an innocent "expression of opinion" and who ask that one should be free to conduct propaganda against the republic and its attributes. To back their claims, they point to countries of the West as examples. The truth is that no democratic country can refrain from defending itself against threats against its regime. In countries where there are very solid traditions of tolerance, it is possible and necessary to be broadminded in the interpretation of where an idea ceases to be an idea and becomes a concrete act. But, in this country, so deeply is the mentality of overkill ingrained in our psyche and so powerful a habit is fanaticism in the right and the left--and even the middle--that, in sensitive public issues, the idea often turns into an act the moment it is put into words.

So, what are we talking about? Some brainwashed female university students claim themselves happy in an anachronistic renunciation of freedom by donning Khomeyni garb and considering this to be the measure of morality, and are wearing various head covers and chador substitutes--each according to sects resurrected from the middle ages--as attempted demonstrations in the republic's universities.

It is claimed that these young ladies, had they been in the United States, would be treated with tolerance! Yes, but do you also stop to consider what else is treated with tolerance in the United States? If we made a list of all the acts of impertinence tolerated in the United States, the first to be nauseated by it would be these poor misled young ladies of ours and their

exploiters. The point that is overlooked is this: such acts of impertinence in the United States count for very little within society. Can we say the same for Turkey?

Just look at what has been going on? The president, the Council of State, and the Supreme Educational Council take a stand in defense of discipline in the republic's educational system against those who misuse the freedom of worship and conscience as a pretext to resist Ataturk's goal of guiding the Turkish nation to modern civilization But, immediately afterward, certain ignoramuses bent on exploiting the religious sentiments of the people swing--as if by previous arrangement--into a campaign in the mosques in defense of "head covers at the University" and attempt to consign Turkish citizens making merry on New Year's Eve to hell! . . .

The scenario is obvious. Reaction has been pampered and spoiled and has dared enter a test of strength with the Ataturkist Republic.

Thus, when the No 2 man in a party, particularly of the party in power, dares to demand that the ruling on the subject of turbans should be made by the Religious Affairs Chairmanship, this impertinence cannot be regarded as a case of "expression of opinion." Because, if this kind of impertinence had occurred in Hyde Park, one would merely laugh it off. But in Turkey, where reaction is currently engaged in an attempted test of strength with the state, such an expression of opinion amounts to very much the same as an act tantamount to "an encouragement to reaction."

Mr Kececiler should be made to bear the consequences of this behavior as soon as possible. His words amount to a downright attempt to stop the Turkish Republic from being a secular state and transform it into a theocratic state. This, under Turkish law, is an offense. Immediate penal legal proceedings must be instituted against him by the prosecutor's office.

Even this is insufficient. Again, under our laws, there is no room for such people in Turkish parties. The chief prosecutor of the republic should ask this person to be permanently expelled from the Motherland Party.

Yes! The defense of the Ataturkist Republic must be conducted solely and exclusively through legitimate channels. Such legitimate channels exist. Legitimacy can be preserved by keeping the channels of legitimacy operating.

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FINANCING OF RELIGIOUS ORDERS QUESTIONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 7 Jan 87 p 2

["Observation" column by Ugur Mumcu: "Religious Orders and Politics"]

[Text] Today, there is not a single rightist party in Turkey which has no ties with religious orders.

It is well known that the "Nakshibendi Order" supports the Motherland Party [MP]. Meanwhile the "Suleymanists" and the "Nurists [followers of the light]" are said to be backing the Correct Way Party [CWP].

Because of that support, [former Prime Minister] Suleyman Demirel writes articles praising Said-i Nursi in the Nurists' press organ KOPRU [bridge]. As in the old days, his motive is to win the support of the Nurists.

The MP and the CWP are engaged in an intense rivalry for the votes of the religious orders. This rivalry will heat up even more during the general elections.

And then?

Then God will help.

Do not be misled by the current verbal duel between Demirel and Ozal. If conditions so require, they can forget everything they are saying today and embrace each other. Let no one doubt that.

The Suleymanists have fairly powerful organizations abroad. For example, the "Islamic Cultural Center" in Koln, FRG, is one of the busiest centers of the Suleymanists. The Islamic Cultural Center has branches in other European cities.

At home, the Suleymanists are propagating their views by offering Koranic courses and funding student hostels.

It is said that the Nurists have also expanded their base of support. The Nurists offer courses in special student hostels and classrooms at home and have powerful organizations abroad.

In Turkey the Nurists publish journals such as the SIZINTI [leakage], KOPRU and SUR [ramparts]. They are also said to have established a "Message of Light Institute" in California. As in the case of other religious orders, the Nurists' main area of operations is the FRG.

The "Ticani" movement led by Kemal Pilavoglu is about to expire. The movement collapsed after Kemal Pilavoglu—who organized attacks against Ataturk's statues in the 1950's—was arrested on charges of sexual molestation of his students and died later on.

The supporters of "National View" endorse the views of former National Salvation Party leader Necmettin Erbakan.

National View organizations—which support the Prosperity Party—are primarily based in the FRG. Gathered around the "Turkish Association of Europe" in the FRG, the supporters of National View have also formed another organization named the "Islamic Youth Association of Europe."

It is an astonishing fact that the supporters of National View have formed the most powerful Islamic organizations in Europe. Meanwhile in Turkey their influence is for the moment confined to the Prosperity Party.

The "Idealist organizations" in Europe also support an Islamic order under the banner of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis." The Idealist organizations which were an extension of the defunct Nationalist Action Party have affiliates in the FRG such as the "Federation of Democratic Idealist Worker Associations," the "Turkish Cultural Center," the "Turkish-German Friendship Association" and the "Idealist Workers' Association."

The most senior official of the organization, Enver Altayli, is a businessman. He owns a seafood store named "Aybakan" right behind the train station in Frankfurt. Altayli is followed by Musa Serdar Celebi in the Idealist hierarchy. Celebi was the leader of the organization known as "Turkish Federation." Celebi, who was acquitted of all charges because of "insufficient evidence" in the trial related to the assassination attempt against the Pope, is now once again a leading Idealist figure.

He is an Idealist leader but the assassination attempt against the Pope has limited the Idealists' breadth of action in Europe.

Moreover, a painful surprise is in store for Idealist organizations in Frankfurt. Dr Korner, the Deputy Public Prosecutor of Frankfurt, is filing a lawsuit against 57 persons including several prominent Idealists on charges of "armed assault and narcotics trafficking."

We believe that Islamic views must be examined in the context of "freedom of thought and conscience." Consequently, we support the abolishment of Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code. When that happens everyone will take his true place on the stage and the "sectarian Ataturkism" of those who pander to various religious orders will be terminated, bringing this "masked ball" to an end.

This is one aspect of the issue. The other aspect is how can these religious orders find the money needed to organize themselves at home and abroad and to "finance" all their publications in a system where political parties can barely survive with the money they get from the Treasury.

Let us assume that the "turban" issue is resolved through the use of prohibitions. Can you tell us how a battle can be waged against "reactionarism" without exposing the financial resources of Islamic organizations?

9588
CSO: 3554/167

COMMENTARY QUESTIONS MOTIVES BEHIND TURBAN ISSUE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 7 Jan 87 pp 1,13

["Yes/No" column by Oktay Akbal: "Is the Covering of Heads the Entire Issue?"]

[Text] Student girls wearing headcovers are knocking on all doors to seek their "rights." They are waging a form of battle. Almost all of them are university-level students. Most of them will be lawyers, doctors, engineers and teachers in 1 or 2 years. They will take on national responsibilities. They will serve using their knowledge and minds. They will have to comply with the requirements of our times. They will do whatever science requires and whatever is good and beneficial for the people and the individual.

But then, what is this battle? They are saying adamantly that they wish to wear headcovers--or turbans neologically. They are saying that if they are not allowed to do what they want to do--that is if they are not allowed to cover their heads--they will not go to school. What does this mean? Do they mean that they will remain ignorant and uneducated? Is covering their heads more important than their lives and the joys and blessings of life? It is astonishing to see that young women who have graduated from high school, who have passed their university entrance examinations and who have chosen and are studying a modern branch of science can be so biased, so inflexible and so removed from modernism, scientific thought and contemporary life.

They reportedly went to the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP], and members of the party's Central Decision and Administrative Council told them: "We respect your beliefs, but we are opposed to having your beliefs govern this country." When one of the girls said "we came from the heartland of Anatolia," one SDPP official reportedly said: "Do not tell us that story. Your motives are political." On the other hand, at the Motherland Party [MP] headquarters, [MP deputy leader Mehmet] Kececiler--who was the leading player of the pro-Koranic-law march in Konya which was said to be one of the primary causes of the 12 September intervention--reportedly told the girls:

"We will eventually resolve this issue. We will seek legal means of solution. You are not the only generation which has been treated with contempt. We too suffered the same pain many years ago. We fought along the same paths to arrive at certain points."

One wonders what type of struggle Kececiler waged years ago. It would be beneficial to know. When he exhorts young people "to resist, to impose, to rebel and to disobey regulations, laws and the Constitution," what forces is he relying on? He says that the young people will also march along the paths he walked and arrive at "certain points." That point is Kececiler's current position in the MP. Which one is more important: "Where a man comes from" or whether he is a truly "enlightened and civilized person" and a man of his time? The President says: "A proper form of attire is required in schools and public offices, but you can wear whatever you want in your home or in the street." But Mr Kececiler is showing the youth ways of disobedience by telling them "to resist, to impose and to do what we did." This is how big the disparity is between the head of state and a senior official of the ruling party. One wonders where this course will lead.

It has been alleged that opposing headcovers is equivalent to opposing human rights. How can these young girls talk about "human rights"? How can the issue of whether you cover your head or not have anything genuinely related to human rights? Human rights means that a citizen can live without torture, torment or fear. It means being free of unemployment, hunger and poverty. It means enjoying freedom in every area. Suppose you cover your heads and no one objects. Would that be the end of the matter? Would all "human rights" have been respected?

The battle over headcovers is in fact a rebellion against Ataturk's reforms and the principles of the republic Ataturk established. In reality, there are other forces behind these young girls. When people like Mr Kececiler protect reactionary attitudes in the ruling party, reactionarism will naturally surge. All of Ataturk's guidelines and aspirations and everything done and built and every step taken for civilization and modernity in this country in the last 60 years will be jeopardized. And the sensible people of this country, the forces which support modernism and civilization will oppose--will have to oppose--that trend.

On 30 August 1925, that is 61 years ago, Ataturk said on this issue: "In some places I see women who cover their faces with pieces of cloth or toweling or similar materials and who turn their backs or sit on the ground in the presence of men. What is the meaning of such behavior? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation engage in such strange behavior and be subjected to such primitive conditions? This situation makes the nation look ridiculous. It must immediately be rectified."

Our university girls' "insistence on headcovers" is "ridiculous" as Ataturk stated 61 years ago. Meanwhile, the failure of girls who come to classrooms to gain knowledge to realize this is dismaying and discouraging for all of us.

9588
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PAPER COMMENTS ON GROWING PROBLEM OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 25 Mar 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Who is Hammering and Sawing?"]

[Text] As far as employment is concerned, Greenland is in a miserable situation these years. It is a small home-rule governed society with an unheard-of high rate of unemployment and with the need for an increasingly higher rate of called-in labor. Who are hammering and sawing from the early morning hours, even if it has been payday and the weather is so wonderful that it would be regular slavery to work hard for money? That is the called-in labor force. What should we have done without the efficient, foolish Danes whom we want to go home?

This state of affairs has now lasted for more than 30 years, and the Greenland young people are still unlikely to become efficient participants in the development of the country. We are very intent on governing the country, and we are able to control our desire to do so, thanks to the qualified, practiced and stable called-in labor force.

But it should now be time for the situation to change, so that it will be the country's own young people who will be hammering and sawing from the early morning hours or will be holding the top positions in the offices of the home-rule government and the municipalities.

There is only one way to achieve this. That is education and the acquisition of a sense of responsibility. In these election times, who would not vote for the candidate who says: My program is to achieve a goal-oriented education. We have to introduce 5-year plans for education, and we will continue to do so until the goal has been achieved and the country is able to manage by means of its own labor force.

It will be a long time before that has been achieved. But why not start with the unemployed young people, who hang around in front of shops with beers in their hands and burden the conscience of the entire society? That is what NIS, the workplace for young people of the Nuuk municipality has done. After having visited NIS, one gets the impression that the initiative is bound to spread to the entire coast.

That is also the impression of Minister Hendrik Nielsen, and he says that NUISINA will work for the dissemination throughout the country of the ideas underlying the establishment of NIS, and applications will be made for additional grants to enable young unemployed people to build their own homes as employment projects.

If we can save the unemployed from ruin, we can proudly tell one another: Things are now improving!

7262

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PAPERS ANALYZE NATION'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

INSEE's Inflation Estimates

[Paris LIBERATION in French 26 Feb 87 p 4]

[Article by Francoise Fressoz: "Bread and Water for Six Months"]

[Text] INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] forecasts a lackluster first half. A 1.9 percent inflation rate will exceed the annual objective of 1.7 percent. The fever is then supposed to come down, but growth will remain weak.

The year 1987 is off to a bad start. Edouard Balladur had thought it would be, and he had been wagering for some time that January's price index would be bad. INSEE recently published a memorandum on the economy that confirms the magnitude of upcoming problems: France will have high inflation (1.9 percent) in the first half and will exceed in 6 months the government's annual objective (1.7 percent). And there is double trouble: the economy will also go into a slump, which will obviously not help the employment situation.

INSEE has a simple explanation for the downturn hitting the French economy: since mid-1986 there has been an abrupt change in the behavior of households and businesses. Families have put the brakes on consumption because their buying power is exhausted. Business has sharply reduced investment. Domestic demand has thus dried up while foreign demand has not picked up the slack. There has been a transition period with a large increase in inventory; now production has weakened and may even fall in the first quarter. In a parallel move, the rise of petroleum products prices and the deregulation of services should cause a noticeable recurrence of inflation in the first three months of 1987.

Now that the report has been made, the problem is to determine whether the dangers haunting the beginning of the year will last or not. INSEE experts remain optimistic and are making a "reasonable wager" that the inflationary fever of the first months of the year will be broken by the wisdom of corporate leaders. They are also counting on them to restart investment and bring up production. But that is just guesswork. In the end it is up to the government to decide whether or not it will be appropriate to alter its economic policy in consideration of its figures for foreign trade, employment, production and prices.

Prices

INSEE forecasts an upward creep of 1.9 percent in the first 6 months of 1987. But this rise will be skewed: it should be high in January, February and March (up a total of 1.4 percent) because of soaring petroleum products prices (up 24 percent) and price deregulation. It should then be much more moderate (up 0.5 percent for April, May and June). INSEE is wagering that oil prices will drop an average of \$2 beginning in the spring. The experts think that business leaders will gradually stop rebuilding reserves. They think especially that the high price fever at the beginning of the year will not cause wage restraints to be reconsidered.

Production

The report forecasts a first-quarter drop of 1 percent in the production of manufactured goods, followed by a slight upturn (0.5 percent). The main reason is that consumption is weak because inflation in the first part of the year has eroded both family buying power and corporate taxes in the first third of the fiscal year. INSEE thus expects a gradual investment recovery to give production a series of shots in the arm. In fact, this could be helped along by the spectacular improvement in business accounts, which are again flourishing as they had been before the first oil embargo. But INSEE also emphasizes the persistence of obstacles: excessively high interest rates, low investment returns compared to returns on corporate financial deals, and weak consumption, which is liable to discourage business. On the international front, INSEE expects few miracles. It thinks that at best the economic situation could improve slightly in the spring and favor a reawakening of French production.

Employment

The number of newly unemployed is predicted to be about 15-20,000 a month, reaching roughly 2.65-2.7 million in mid-1987. This increase is explained by demographic factors but also by the depressed state of the economy; industry is expected to lose 70,000 jobs in 6 months, and the tertiary sector is expected to create fewer jobs than in 1986 (up 40,000 in only 6 months). Finally, INSEE emphasizes that the youth employment program, which yielded good results by the end of 1986, is liable to run out of steam as an increasing number of young people are entering the job market.

Balance of Trade

This is the rosy part of the report. Despite a 30 percent rise in its energy bill, France is expected to balance its books by the end of the first half. Aside from energy, imports are expected to be much more moderate than last year because of the weakness in consumption. On the other hand, considering how bitter international competition is, it is not certain that French industrialists will succeed in recapturing the market shares that they have lost in recent years; as INSEE says, this will require a massive renewal of investment.

Balladur Advocates Patience

Paris LES ECHOS in French 6 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by Cl. C.: "Edouard Balladur Rules Out Any Economic Stimulus"]

[Text] Edouard Balladur insisted on sending as clear an answer as possible yesterday to all those in government or among its business partners who might be tempted to propose stimulating the economy: "There is at present no cause for any general or sectoral support. Be patient," said the Finance minister to the members of La Boetie Institute. "We must wait for our policy to bear fruit, and it will take time."

According to Mr Balladur, there are four arguments for holding course: first, the investment forecasts and business outlook, which he considers satisfactory. Of course, industrial production is showing signs of weakness, but the slowdown is, according to the minister, to be chalked up to the effects of increased inventory. He thinks the machinery will start up again in the second half of 1987.

Second point: the French economy has at present absolutely no means for launching a recovery that, the minister says, would run up against a still very tight foreign market. "The time has not yet come to get careless, considering how fragile our balance of trade is."

Finally, Mr Balladur does not intend to jeopardize the implementation of the 1987 Finance law and the planned reduction in the budget deficit at a time when it is already necessary to plan on saving an additional Fr 7.5 billion in order to deal with inevitable slippages and unemployment.

There can be no question, as some have suggested, of using the money from privatization to finance any big projects and thus satisfying "the appetites of the ministers in charge or the business leaders concerned. The money from denationalization will be used as prescribed by law," he says, "that is, to pay off the national debt (by more than half) and to provide public corporations with capital." Mr Balladur says that the money thus repaid will somehow naturally return to the companies and thus be reinvested.

To put an end to a debate that he considers "not very serious," the minister concluded by stating that the 1987 budget increases to the sectors particularly tempted by a small push, namely highways (up 7.9 percent), capital expenditures (up 8.3 percent), research (up 3.7 percent) and housing (up 33 percent) were appreciable and sufficient.

8782

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VON BUELOW REOPENS BUNDESWEHR STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE ARGUMENT

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 86 pp 57-64

[Article by Andreas von Buelow: "Bundeswehr Structure of the 1990s--Achieving Structural Nonattack Capability"]

[Text] It is not only since the time when he was parliamentary state secretary (1976-1980) under Hans Apel at Hardthoehe [FRG Defense Ministry] that Dr Andreas von Buelow has been concerned about Germany's security policy. It must be acknowledged that he propounds his ideas with sincerity and that he believes he can alter strategy within the alliance. Thus von Buelow, who is acting member of the defense committee in the German Bundestag for his fraction, also deserves that his thoughts be thoroughly examined. His study, submitted on 30 January 1984, is entitled "Thoughts on the Further Development of Defense Strategies in West and East." In October of the previous year, von Buelow expressed his ideas on structural non-attack capability in LOYAL [magazine]. In an interview at that time, in response to the question of an alternative to the deterrence strategy, he said that an option would be "to create a structural non-attack capability, thereby no longer having the capability to invade deeply into enemy territory. For this, we must abandon our highly mobile defense structures, both in the Bundeswehr and in the Red Army." However, in response to the question of whether he believes that today's Bundeswehr possesses the attack capability he characterized, von Buelow replied: "No. It does not even have the maps needed to invade the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, our allies are making every effort so that we do not attain such a capability." With the publication of the following document, WT gives von Buelow an opportunity to expound upon his most recent defense policies, which also found support at the SPD congress in Nuernberg. And so today we can say that the discussion continues.

The Strategy's Credibility Gap

NATO commander-in-chief Rogers promises his allies a conventional-defense capability of at most 3 to 5 days in case of serious conflict. Thereafter, should deterrent strategy fail, atomic weaponry would be introduced. This is the message by an alliance of the wealthiest, most populated nations, to their soldiers, their draftees, and their taxpayers. German taxpayers alone pay over DM50 billion annually for the equivalent of a conventional 3-day defense.

And for this equivalent, these draftees are compelled to make a contribution of 18 months of basic training. Soldiers and civilians alike almost unanimously reject the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance. Even an American president would refrain from overstepping the nuclear threshold in a serious confrontation. We are in a situation of being frightened by our own deterrence policies, which are of little credibility both internally and from without. Are there no alternatives to the outdated NATO concept of the world? What contribution can we Germans in the FRG make to resolve this problem?

Reexamination of the German Contribution to the Alliance Deemed Unavoidable

Many circumstances compel us to reexamine and modify our present Bundeswehr structure. The 50 percent drop in the number of draftees caused by the low-birth-rate years makes it impossible to maintain the defense contribution in its present structure and extent. There is no need to extend the tour of duty of young draftees to 18 months. The presently planned increased use of long-term servicemen will fail because of the labor market of the 1990's and the estimated costs. Even at present personnel levels, the costs of technical modernization can no longer be borne. Currently, the Bundeswehr is being renewed only on a piecemeal basis. There are no financial resources for a harmonious and coordinated development of the system as a whole.

Wasted Training Leads to Waste, Lack of Effectiveness and Unnecessarily Longer Tour of Service

If the personnel situation alone causes us to reexamine the Bundeswehr's contribution to the alliance, then some effort should be made to solve a whole series of problems not yet addressed. The Bundeswehr's present defense force of approximately 1.3 million soldiers is in a qualitative sense by no means secure. The persistent peacetime level of 495,000 troops tends to conceal the fact that most draftees, despite their often expensive training, will later as reservists have to perform duties for which they had not been trained. The annual wasted training for the field army and the non-training of the territorial army must be eliminated. Each draftee must be trained from the very beginning for the specific mission awaiting him later as a reservist. One must heed the fact that in a society favoring a less than 40-hour work week, the service time pressure on soldiers will be compared with civilian working conditions.

Infantry Weakness and Armored Units

The oft lamented weakness of the Bundeswehr infantry is a consequence of a dangerously one-sided structure of the field army. This deficiency is common to all NATO forces, whose conventional defense capability is based upon highly mobile, armored units. These units are designed for attack combat. They enable the forces to gain new victories as well as to regain lost territory. In the defense-oriented NATO strategy, their task is counterattack.

Both Sides Defend With Forces Structured for Attack

The Warsaw Pact bases its conventional defense on comparable structures. A East bloc armored unit differs little from an armored company in the West. Only the politically declared will on both sides not to attack makes the imperceptible distinction between attack and counterattack structures in terms of weaponry and tactics. The frequently emphasized lack of logistics furnishes no rebutting evidence.

Forward Defense Would Be Overrun Even in a Military Equilibrium

In an emergency, NATO will be unable to conduct a forward defense along the inner German border with its highly mobile armored units, or else, after a short time it will lose the battle. For even in an equilibrium of forces, those highly mobile Eastern armored units would not be stopped near the border by Western forces, as shown in Figure 1. It is obvious that present military structure can only be used for defense in a militarily effective way if it invades enemy territory in counterattack. The attacker pierces the weakest point of the defense, and the attacked country responds with a counterattack at the weakest point of the attacker, at his flanks. Both seek to break the resistance by means of shock attacks and weakening in the hinterland. In an emergency NATO would be forced in the same direction because of the realities of the situation.

Present Structures of Both Sides Provide No Stability. Early First Use of Nuclear Weapons Is Structurally Established

The recognition of this militarily operative principle has far-reaching consequences. If both sides abide by the same structures in the coming decades, there will be no military stability in East-West relations, even if a balance of forces in terms of troops and arms is attained. The dependence of the defender on the first use of nuclear weapons remains unavoidable. Additional armored units will not solve this problem. Today the armored materiel of the Bundeswehr is twice as great as that of the Wehrmacht when it invaded the Soviet Union. In 1940, despite a balance of forces, France was unable to stop the German invasion, and in 1941, the Soviet Union, despite a superiority of 24,000 defending tanks to Germany's attacking 3,300, could not repel the attacking German armored units until just before Moscow.

Present Defense Structure Not Capable of Disarmament

Considering today's balance of forces, those who would counter attacking armored units exclusively with armored units near the border can hardly disarm in clear conscience. This counterattacking force becomes a kind of fan that will not stop an attack launched by the enemy for a specific time, location, and strength. The present structures offer both sides massive incentives for arming, because stability does not appear to be attainable. The Vienna troop reduction negotiations have thus far failed, not only because of Soviet stubbornness. The forward defense strategy, which is strained to breaking-point, has proven to be, on the Western side, a considerable obstacle to dismantling mass armies. It is only within this reality that one can understand the West's most recent negotiations proposal made in Vienna after 13 years of

negotiations [which called] for a reduction of 5,000 Soviet troops and 3,000 American troops (without weapons!).

Military Structures of Both Sides Without Political Perspective

Present structures not only make disarmament unlikely, indeed nearly impossible, but they also lack any perspective for the political development of Europe. The instability of the military equilibrium makes the goal of demilitarization of the East-West conflict unattainable. The step-by-step withdrawal of Soviet troops from the forward front which they gained in World War II at a cost of 20 million dead, is unthinkable, because to do so would result in a military power-gradient shift between the two German states of 3:1 in favor of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union must seek to balance this power-gradient from the Eastern perspective, in its own interest, and those of the GDR leadership and even Poland's. However, the outlook for an evolutionary further development of the communist social order for the peoples of central and eastern Europe depends on the threat to Soviet military interests. And Soviet military interests, in any questionable situation, will always have priority.

Military Structures as Subject of East-West Negotiations

Thus for military, disarmament policy, and foreign policy reasons, it is not only the Bundeswehr structure that should be modified towards structural capability for viable forward defense, but there is also the question of making military structures into the subject of discussions, modifications and agreements between East and West.

Modifications Must Be Made Gradually From the Existing Structures. Forward Defense of All Allies Is Required

It would be illusionary, however, to deviate nonpragmatically from present structures to reform the Bundeswehr structure. It took decades to create them. Enormous sums were invested in the effort, which can not be scrapped overnight. This is particularly true for our European and American allies, on whose cooperation we depend and whose own structures we cannot simply dictate. Therefore, in any proposal presented here, there should be no significant change in the old, NATO-integrated defense structure. In the forward defense zone there would be no change in responsibility of the allied forces for the particular defense area.

42 Armored Brigades of the Bundeswehr--Displacement of Infantry

The proposed Bundeswehr structure provides for 42 Bundeswehr armored brigades in the German combat zones, with an 80-90 percent peacetime presence. The armored brigade with a defense strength of about 3,000 men will be somewhat reduced. Half of the infantry capacity of the current armored and armored grenadier brigades would be assumed by territorial covering forces. Two home defense brigades per corp combat area are foreseen to be used in the rear area and as reserves.

Field Army and Territorial Army Will Merge Into a Unified Defense Organization

The field army and territorial army will merge into a unified, zone defense organization. The corps zones, until now existing only for the forward defense, will be extended to the western border of the FRG. A German army corps would be formed in each of the seven created corps combat zones. The command levels of division, defense area, reserve troops detachment and territorial detachment will be eliminated. The present defense kreis and bezirk detachments would be dissolved along with their missions with home defense detachments and home defense regiments.

Responsibility in German Combat Zones

In the German corps combat zones the army corps would be responsible not only for the forward defense zone but also for command over the total military defense organization from the intra-German border to the western border. The German army corps leads the German armored brigades, corps troops and territorial home defense units. The civilian-military cooperation, logistics, field replacement units, and the support of the allied forces for defense would rest in one hand.

Subordination in Allied Combat Zones

Allied supreme command would maintain responsibility for the allied forces within the allied combat zones of the forward defense zone. In a state of tension or during a defense situation, German home defense forces will be subordinated to the appropriate allied supreme command in the forward defense zone. In the rear defense zone, the home defense units will be subordinated to the German army corps, which in peacetime is also responsible for all German troop units of the forward defense zone.

Building an Antitank and a Strong Air Defense Organization. Configuration of an Integrated Forward Defense

The defense effort, which until now has consisted almost exclusively of highly mobile armored units, will be reinforced in the forward defense zone by a regionally organized defense covering the entire territory of the FRG by home defense regiments. Both structural elements will be combined into an integrated forward defense.

A Home Defense Regiment With 2,000 Troops Per 20 Square Kilometers

A regiment leads 2,000 troops and in the border districts covers a zone of about 20 km in diameter. The regiment is organized into eight infantry companies with 180 troops each, supported by an engineer company, a medical company and also a command unit with telecommunications, antiaircraft defense and supply personnel.

Home Defense Forces in the Rear Zone

The rearward defense zone will require an average of one home defense regiment per district. The present-day troop divisions of the territorial army will be incorporated into these regiments, to the extent that they will be needed in the future.

Operational Readiness Level Between 10 and 22 Percent

Home defense regiments in the forward area are to be represented at 10 percent strength in peacetime, and in the rear area at 8 percent in addition to draftees in training and army training camps. They will be led by home defense commands subordinated to the army corps. In time of emergency, the regiments will be expanded by reservists living in the vicinity. Population figures along the intra-German border in the reserve call-up areas up to 50 kilometers are sufficient to bring the approximately 140 home defense regiments from 28,000 troops in peacetime to 280,000 troops in case of an emergency.

60 Percent of the Federal Republic of German Territory Is Not Suited for Armored Attack. Home Training and Utilization

Infantry regiments are not suited for territorial attacks, because without armor, they are unprotected outside of their zone of defense. They exploit the exact geographic knowledge of their hometown surroundings and use as protection the terrain in which they were trained as draftees. Sixty percent of the total area of the Federal Republic of Germany is hardly suited for armored combat if the defender takes advantage of forests, construction and terrain obstacles.

Use of Personnel and Material Civilian Structures

Regiments utilize the local infrastructure (telephone communications, construction capacity, transportation vehicles, etc.). The personnel operating this equipment is built into the reserve structure. Since local infantry units do not cause troop massings and substantial movements, they are hardly considered to be artillery and aerial targets. Calling reservists into this structure, unlike calling them into armored units, does not have a crisis-escalating effect.

First-Class and Modern Armament

Antitank and antiaircraft weaponry of contemporary technology are foreseen for the time being. A home defense regiment has 214 machine guns, 222 panzerfausts, 80 antitank rocket systems and 16 Stinger antiaircraft rocket systems. Arms costs for all forward defense regiments are DM442 million. Defense inventories of ammunition, likewise for the forward defense zone, will cost DM2.9 billion. Annual operations costs are approximately DM1.3 billion. Current Bundeswehr procurements will lead to a reduction in future needs.

Defensive Weapons in Development Strengthen Effectiveness and Survivability of the Infantry

If the soon to be procured state-of-the-art weapons are included, the armed forces will be significantly strengthened, i.e., through sensor-guided mines and intelligent mine fields. The entire combat support potential of the corps troops would be at the disposal of the home defense regiments, into which the artillery observers at corps and brigade levels would be integrated. Since minefield clearing is becoming increasingly difficult, there is a need for combat drones, elevated combat platforms, artillery shell mines and antitank helicopters as well as a tank defense force capable of inflicting substantial attrition rates against attacking armored units. At the same time, the survival chances of infantry reinforced in this way are substantially increased. Cost estimates are less than half of those that would be needed for new acquisitions required for a single Bundeswehr armored division.

Belief in the Miracle of Armor Protection. Dug-in Infantry Has More Chance of Survival

The objection that in modern warfare infantry has no chance of survival is not correct even under current conditions. Dug-in, infantry with cover has better survival chances against the third dimension than does the crew of a tank, of an armored personnel carrier, or even of an M-113 troop transporter sheathed in aluminum sheeting.

Division of Work: Armored Units Assume Combat Roles for Major Attacks

NATO armored units, between and behind the operational zones of the home defense regiments, once freed from the need to make a border march around the circumference, can now be totally and exclusively utilized for responding to enemy attack; that is, they can be targeted against those critical points where breakthroughs are feared.

Harassment and the Second Wave

Home defense regiments, subsequent to an invasion of their operational zones by superior enemy forces, proceed to harass unarmored supply trains and the so-called second wave with infantry combat units. They do not abandon their cover or terrain protection. They do not follow the front of the mobile units, but instead are targeted against the forces attacking their home territory.

Neither Cannon Fodder Nor Lost Masses

The infantry of the home defense regiments has the same combat support in the form of heavy weapons as present or future armored brigades. They do not conduct a war of life or death, and know that their mission is equally difficult but also as fulfillable as that of armored combat troops or other arms units.

Air Force Structure Must Be Modified on the Medium or Long Term

NATO air forces have the mission of defending their own homeland from the attacks of foreign air forces. For home air defense they utilize equipment ranging from rockets to superior fighter planes. Air superiority can also be won by destroying enemy air forces on the ground, whether those forces be in the form of aircraft or ground facilities. Finally, it is the mission of the air forces to support army units by cutting off the combat field from enemy reinforcement. Only thereafter, if at all, do they intervene in the combat action of the ground troops.

Air Forces Can Destroy but Not Take Land

Air force equipment is of a subordinated consideration for the perspective of a structural non-attack capability if the field armies are structurally no longer attack capable, as are the units designed for taking land targets. Aircraft and rockets can destroy high-density traffic points and major military movements, and they can make airports unusable. But they cannot occupy land, for only land forces can do this. If the field army units are designed for defense but not for land acquisition, then no matter how the air force is equipped for air attack, there no longer exists an actual basis of possible destabilization, i.e., capability of land acquisition, forceful displacement, or the elimination of borders.

Cordoning Off the Combat Field Is Imperative

One cannot avoid the use of the air force cordoning off the combat field against subsequent enemy reinforcement. In the interest of the stability of East-West relations, and also for simple cost reasons, this should be at the center of a strip confined to 50 to 100 km on each side of the land border. One portion can be assumed by the field artillery by firing upon mine fields or the deployment of reconnaissance and combat drones. The air force must defend its very expensive carriers via standoff weapons having considerably short or at most medium ranges. Planning between field and air forces requires intensive coordination.

Reinforcing Air Defense

Defense of home air space must be reinforced. Hawk and Patriot rockets are available against combat aircraft flying at high and medium altitudes. Since the rocket ring can be broken or circumvented, a system of fighters used only for air defense must be created. This brings to mind the very significant reinforcing weaponry of the United States. At lower altitudes the air defense is supported by air defense forces of the corps.

Balance Between Air Defense and Air Attack

If possible to integrate all defensive systems of the chessboard-like flight defense system of the home defense forces so that the attrition rate of incoming enemy aircraft rises so much so that the enemy has no possible

chance of victory through destroying the attacked target, then one must abstain from the present aggressive planning of attack against the enemy air force structure shortly after the beginning of armed conflict. If the present mobile units are reduced either by one side or both, and are reinforced and replaced by a more static, infantry-like defense, then both sides would reduce the air targets to a certain extent. Armored units in their peacetime installations or when moving are excellent targets for enemy air attacks. Air defense infantry troops, concealed within the terrain, are not a target of this type.

Procurement Cycles of the Air Force


The long-term possibility of redirecting air force development cannot be avoided and is due to very extended and extremely expensive procurement cycles. After delivery of Tornado, it will not be until the turn of the century that successive models for a new ground combat aircraft will be discussed. Until that time, deployment practices could change, and other changes could include the creation of deployment weapons for the carrier systems or through negotiated pacts.

The Network Structure Makes Forward Defense Effective

Interweaving static home defense regiments with mobile combat armored units brings to NATO's conventional deterrence an improvement which can scarcely be pierced. It is worth mentioning that the relationship between the combat soldier and supporting home defense regiment is extremely important, whereas armored units should be utilized for logistics, leadership, coordination, transport and security in most instances.

In World War II: No Attack Success Below a Superiority of 6:1. On Conceivable Attack Axes

In general, an Eastern attacker cannot equip at will many chief attack axes with sufficient superiority to assure an invasion. Using a realistic total strength configuration of at most 2:1 after a short march by both sides, an initial 64 divisions on the Eastern side and 32 divisions on the Western side (which currently have a higher average personnel strength), at most only three attack axes could be equipped at a superiority relationship of 5:1. Even at these localized 5:1 relationships on three axes, the attacking side would have to leave large areas on the border nearly unoccupied and would risk far-reaching counterattack possibilities. In World War II, neither the Soviet nor American forces, despite air superiority and deficits of fuel, materials, and munitions on the German side, were able to break through with a less than 6:1 advantage.



Bundeswehrstruktur der 90er Jahre
Ein Vorschlag von Dr. Andreas von Bulow
(19)

Vordere Verteidigungszone
mit verdichtetem
Heimatschutz

(20)

Hintere Verteidigungszone
einschließlich
Heimatschutz


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(24)

[Key on following page]

Key:

1. NATO - Central Europe
35 divisions (division equivalents) + 15 French divisions + reinforcements
2. The three fronts of the first echelon
26 Soviet divisions + 20 Warsaw Pact divisions (less Hungary)
3. Second Echelon
49 divisions
4. In addition to strategic reserves
- 3 armored divisions
- 12 infantry divisions
- 1 airborne division
5. Second Guard Army
6. 1 armored division (Soviet Union)
1 motorized infantry division (Soviet Union)
1 armored division (German Democratic Republic)
2 motorized infantry divisions (German Democratic Republic)
7. Northern Group
8. 2 armored divisions (Soviet Union)
5 armored divisions (Poland)
3 motorized infantry divisions (Poland)
9. Third Shock Army (armored)
10. 4 armored divisions (Soviet Union)
1 motorized infantry division (Soviet Union)
11. 20th Guard Army
1 armored division (Soviet Union)
4 motorized infantry divisions (Soviet Union)
12. 8th Guard Army
13. 2 motorized infantry divisions (Soviet Union)
1 armored division (German Democratic Republic)
2 motorized infantry divisions (German Democratic Republic)
14. First Guard Armored Army
4 armored divisions (Soviet Union)
1 motorized infantry division (Soviet Union)
15. Central Group
16. 2 armored divisions (Soviet Union)
3 motorized infantry divisions (Soviet Union)
1 motorized infantry division (Czechoslovakia)
17. Czechoslovakian Group
18. 3 armored divisions (Czechoslovakia)
2 motorized infantry divisions (Czechoslovakia)
19. Bundeswehr structure of the 1990s
A suggestion of Dr Andreas von Buelow
20. Forward Defense Zone with concentrated home defense
21. Rear Defense Zone including home defense
22. Army corps including corps troops
23. Armored brigade
24. Home defense brigade (armored infantry)

Networked Forward Defense and Border Population

The additional support for a more regional and locally organized defense would make a concession to the psychological situation of the populace living near the border. The current policy of advising border dwellers to remain at home during the course of an attack (stay put policy) is not psychologically viable in view of a changing and perhaps softening front. The situation changes, however, with the ground-cover defense of reservists living in the vicinity. These [troops] protect their homeland as well as their own families. Thus a defense posture cannot be dismissed as poorly conceived.

Civilizing the Armed Forces Instead of Militarizing Society

The reproach of militarizing society is wrong. Units composed of volunteers can be militarized and can then take on the character of a volunteer corps. A professional army can devote itself to a military way of thinking. A conscript army supplemented by professionals and voluntary long-term cadres can also attempt to get unresistant 18-year-old draftees to accept military structure through commands and obedience. A reserve unit, which has trained together yearly and has regular, short-duration exercises, grows out of the 18-year-old yes-man type and becomes a community of adults who have completed their training, who are employed, who have families, and who do not generally permit themselves to be ordered about as an 18-year-old would. This "keeping each other under control," which is generally found in society, also occurs in reservist units. In these units, the gas station attendant is next to the trade union official, the farmer next to the teacher, the skilled worker next to the proprietor and master tradesman. There is practically no military community less susceptible to militarization danger than that of obligatory reservists. Reservists place great demands on leadership as well as on the formulation of their mission, which 18-year-olds generally cannot fulfill. This inherent characteristic necessitates utilizing reservists only in units led by peers, from the middle leadership ranks all the way to regimental commanders. It is not a militarization of society but a civilizing of the armed forces, indeed a democratization of defense, that is sought. And this is not accomplished only through democratic legitimate control from above, but rather, from democratic self-regulation beginning within the small combat unit.

400,000-Troop Genuine Presence Plus 200,000-Troop Reinforcement Availability

Structure is calculated with a peacetime presence of 400,000 troops, a draftee tour of duty of 12 months, and a reinforcement obligation for each soldier upon terminating his tour of service of 2 years. Variations above and below these figures are conceivable. This is a question of the cost of the entire system, but also consideration for the motivation of the draftees for their later mission as reservists. In armored units, as long as the need for a high operational readiness level remains, there will be no reduction in the tour of duty. Mobilized units will have a tour of duty of 15 months, with the shorter period of time stemming from war exercise time. Home defense regiments could,

on the other hand, exist with an active tour of a maximum of 12 months, supplemented by regular short exercises as reservists. The duration and frequency of combat training exercises would be determined solely from the objective of the specific training and not from operational constraints. Acceptance on the part of the civilian populace and industry would arise from suitable exercise planning and from establishing the training cycle one to two years in advance. This would require drastically limiting the number of exemptions from service. Reservist organizations would be stratified subordinately within companies and regiments.

Conventional NATO Defense. Foregoing First Use of Nuclear Weapons Is Possible

The proposed structure eliminates the Bundeswehr's infantry weakness and makes conventional NATO forward defense completely effective. It affords a contribution that only Germany itself can make. Through this proposal, NATO becomes a low profile organization in peacetime, but in periods of confrontation [it becomes] a rapidly mobilized, modern, stable organization, a static shield or hedgehog structure in its role as supplementary armed forces, behind and within mobile units in a sword structure, forming critical points and winning back lost terrain. The very problematic movement of allied troops in a crisis or even in an active defense situation from their peacetime posts to the operational area, often across hundreds of kilometers on rail and road transportation, can be achieved behind a planned border cover and above all through a secured hinterland. The delaying combat role of border lands, which in current NATO planning is also used for straightening the forward defense line, would not be considered in the new structure. An invading force would have to assume meeting the full and immediate resistance of all forces upon crossing the border. If the enemy arrives with a substantial advantage, it would encounter not only the resistance of the home defense regiments, but it also would immediately be dealing with the combat units of all allied forces.

Increasing the Duty Tour Is Not Necessary

The problem of the low birth rate years in terms of present numbers of potential draftees can be resolved without resorting to extending the basic tour of service. Temporal extension of this "foolishness" is unnecessary. Instead, those "fully trained stay-at-homes" will be called out for stand-by readiness and reserves. The personnel structure is thus in conformity with the low birth rates leading to the draftee situation of the 1990s.

Structure Becomes a Disarmament Tool

This structure makes the Bundeswehr capable for the first time of reducing troop strength on both sides without endangering the capability for a forward defense.

Both Sides Must Subordinate Military Structures to the Need for Peace

Proceeding with the formation of the supplementary static defense elements, both sides should become acquainted with adapting the military defense

structures to the political attitude established decades ago that wars in Europe can no longer be justified. Both sides must modify their defense from its current [structure], from attack structures to those that secure national defense and yet are not suited for attack themselves. The Soviet Union and its partners must then withdraw, reduce, or dissolve substantial portions of their mobile sword units, and replace shield and hedgehog structures which are not suited for mobile warfare. Corresponding units on our side, in step with Soviet moves, could be modified in their inner relationships or even be dissolved.

Worst Case: The Other Side Does Not Go Along

If the Eastern side maintains its present structures, then it is up to the West to take advantage of a network forward defense. It can attain independence from a first-strike use of nuclear weapons as a means of compensating for conventional weakness, thus gaining a notable increase in crisis stability without an enormous investment in additional expensive armored units or the still more costly FO/FA weapons.

Unilateral Measures Are Possible

The transition from the former armored monostructure to the networked double structure can be carried out unilaterally on the Western side. A lengthy discussion on a proposed change in Western strategy according to German wishes is not needed, and the armed forces structure of our allies need not be changed during this phase.

A Total European Defense Structure Is Feasible

The Eastern side could be faced with the decisive element of a total European security structure in the form of the shield and hedgehog structure. It would also put the crucial factor onto the other side. Detailed disarmament negotiations could take place during the course of this process, rather than at the beginning.

Navy

The naval forces will pardon me for not having mentioned them in this phase of the discussion.

13225/8309
CSO: 3620/73

BRIEFS

MIRAGE AIRCRAFT OFFSETS--The initial official proposals by French companies for Greek exports as offsets for our purchase of Mirage 2000 aircraft have been already submitted. The deputy minister of national economy, Mr. A. Georgiades, stated yesterday, that the initial four proposals under review by the offsets Office concern: 1 About 67,000 metric tons of hard wheat, crop of 1986; appraised at about 3 billion drachmas, for the Italian market; 2 About 1.000 metric tons of sun-flower oil, appraised at about 85,000,000.00 drachmas for the Turkish market; 3 About 1.650 metric tons of cotton seed, appraised at about 22,000,000.00 drachmas for the Turkish market; 4 marble, ready-to-wear clothes and pickled peppers in small quantities for the French market. Furthermore, the ministry of national economy instructed the Panhellenic Exporters Association on the criteria for the exports' approval, which are formulated in cooperation with the firms participating in the construction of the Mirage 2000 aircraft, within the framework of the offsets agreement. [Text] [Athens VRARADYNI in Greek 27 Feb 87 p 19] 13373/9190

WEU MEMBERSHIP--It is a fact! The Greek government has expressed a vivid interest in joining the Western European Union (!); however, the general secretariat of the very "tough" and very, very pro-NATO WEU is snubbing us for the time being (!) and is reminding us that the Spanish and Portuguese candidacies are preceding ours!!! Please be reminded that among the EEC members only Denmark, Greece and Ireland have not joined the Union. What is most peculiar, is the utter secrecy about the negotiations between Athens and the Western European Union. However, the WEU officials were taken by surprise by the Greek petition, and understandably so; for they never expected NATO's "naughty kids" to ever be interested in such a participation. Eh, how sometimes the world turns upside down, Andreas of our heart.....[Text] [Athens PONDIKI in Greek 27 Feb 87 p 4] 13373/9190

CSO: 3521/90

FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY ISSUES REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMS EXPORTS

Rome GAZZETTA UFFICIALE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA in Italian No 284, 6 Dec 86
pp 19-21

[Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Trade: "Rules and Regulations Regarding the Granting of Authority for the Export and Transit of Armaments;" issued 4 December 1986]

[Excerpt] Article 1

Presentation Of An Authorization Request

1. Requests for authorization for export of armaments, preferably prepared in compliance with the export authorization model referred to in Ministry of Foreign Trade Circular No 32/86 of 25 November 1986, must be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and must contain the following information:

- a) first name and family name or name of business, and the office location of the exporter;
- b) CCIA [Chamber of Commerce] registration number;
- c) tax number or IVA [Value Added Tax] number;
- d) type of material to be exported (customs category and statistical code, official classification based on the customs fee, detailed description of the technical characteristics of the product for exact identification. If the materials are spare parts, the category of materials to which they belong must be indicated; for other parts, any information needed for exact identification must be given);
- e) quantity and value of the material to be exported, expressed in numbers and written out fully;
- f) customs office handling customs clearance;
- g) country of destination and code;

h) name, family name, and name of business or official classification of the purchaser;

i) name and family name, name of business or official classification of the final user;

l) form of payment;

m) authorized signature of the body that, under the terms of the company organization, is legally responsible for the operation.

2. The following information also must be given:

a) any special aspects relating to the operation (inclusion of foreign material, either as a temporary import, in transit or already cleared by customs; expenses abroad, fees to intermediaries and compliance of these payments with the ministerial decree of 12 March 1981 and subsequent amendments; shipment without payment commitments, training courses, and so on);

b) the authorizations obtained within the past 3 years for the export of armaments and the papers presented as proof that the material has arrived at the destination specified in the related authorizations; alternatively, a declaration that no authorization for export of armaments has been obtained in the last 3 years must be presented;

3. If the export operation also is subject to foreign exchange regulations, the application procedures for requests specified in Ministry of Foreign Trade Circular No 95967 of 30 November 1984 apply.

Article 2

Documents Required

Requests for authorization for the export of armaments must be accompanied by the following documents:

a) authorization for commercial activity issued by the Ministry of Defense;

b) international import certificate (CI) issued by the importing country, or certificate of final use (EUC), authenticated by the Italian diplomatic or consular authorities with competence for the country in question;

c) copy of the supply contract;

d) copy of the company documents specifying the body legally responsible for the operation; responsibility for the operation can be referred to the company in all cases.

e) copy of the documents attesting to the qualifications of the manufacturer, in compliance with the provisions of Article 10 of Law No 110 of 18 April 1975.

Article 3

Acceptance of The Request

1. Requests which fail to include any of the information referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 1 hereto, or which are not accompanied by the documents specified in Article 2 will not be accepted.
2. However, if it becomes clear only during the course of the inquiry that the goods in question are "armaments," the request must be supplemented by any of the information and documents listed in articles 1 and 2 hereto and not previously included.

Article 4

Ministerial Inquiry

1. When it has been ascertained that all the information and documents listed in articles 1 and 2 have been provided, the administrative phase of the inquiry will focus on acquiring any other information and additional material that may prove necessary for a precise identification and complete evaluation of all aspects of the operation with political and economic significance for the country.
2. When there are intermediaries involved, the declaration specified in the ministerial decree of 16 October 1986 must be submitted; this declaration must be signed by the person who signed the authorization request and who assumes full legal responsibility thereto; in addition, there must be supporting material testifying to the fact that the action taken was necessary to conclude a contract.
3. The last phase of the inquiry, to be conducted with the agreement of the other ministries and agencies involved, and with the assistance of the advisory bodies responsible for this, will concentrate on ascertaining the reliability of all the supporting material presented and on evaluating the feasibility of the operation in terms of political and economic considerations and national security. Particular attention will be paid to ascertaining the real possibilities for use of the material to be exported by the importing country; this will be done by the agencies responsible for this.

Article 5

Issuing Of The Authorization

Once the inquiry phase has been completed successfully, the export authorization will be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and by the Ministry of Finance, in conformity with Article 1 of the ministerial decree of 20 November 1967.

The export and transit of armaments and all other operations specified must be carried out within the time limits indicated on the authorizations.

Article 6

Issuing of the License Required Under Article 28 of the Consolidation Act of the Laws of Public Security and Supervisory Operations

1. For the export operation to be effected the license from the Ministry of the Interior specified in Article 23 of the consolidation act of the laws of public security approved by Royal Decree No 773 of 18 June 1931 must also be obtained.
2. Control of the proper conditions of transfer of armaments from the production plant to the border falls within the area of competence of the police and national security agencies.

Article 7

Subsequent Controls On The Destination Of Armaments

1. Within 60 days from the date of expiry of the export authorization, the exporter must present to the Ministry of Foreign Trade the confirmation form (FV) issued by the competent authorities of the importing country or a copy of the customs import declarations or receipts from the importing company; the latter documents must be translated into Italian; both the original documents and the related translations must be authenticated by the Italian diplomatic and consular authorities in the countries involved.
2. Holders of an authorization for export of armaments requesting an extension or a modification must provide the Ministry of Foreign Trade with the present status of the authorization in question and must present the supporting documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article relating to shipments already made on the basis of the aforesaid authorization.
3. If the documents specified in paragraph 1 are not submitted, no further authorization for export of armaments will be issued to the exporter.
4. If the documents specified in paragraph 2 are not submitted, the extensions or modifications requested will not be granted.

Article 8

Transit Operations

1. With respect to transit operations for armaments, Article 32 of the ministerial decree of 18 July 1985, as well as the conditions specified in UIC Circular No 2/20 of 18 July 1985, published in the regular supplement to Official Gazette No 200 of 26 August 1985, and UIC Circular No 2/21 of 3 September 1986, published in Official Gazette No 219 of 20 September 1986, continue to apply.
2. Authorization requests must contain the information listed in paragraph 1, with the exception of that specified under letter f), and, when necessary,

also must include the information listed in paragraph 2 of article 1 of this decree.

3. Authorization requests must be accompanied by the supporting documents specified under letters c), d), and e) of Article 2 of this decree, as well as a copy of the purchase contract.

4. The request will be investigated in accordance with the conditions specified in Article 4 of this decree.

5. For the purposes of the investigation procedure, any information, supporting documents, and other material required by the nature of the shipment may be requested.

Article 9

Failure To Fulfill The Conditions Of This Decree

Requests for authorization for export and transit of armaments submitted by parties who have not fulfilled the conditions and requirements of this decree during the execution of previous operations authorized under the aforementioned decree will not be accepted.

Article 10

Publicity

1. This decree will be published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic.

Rome, 4 December 1986

[Signed] Minister Formica

8615

CSO: 3528/M208

NATO VETO CONSIDERED IN SPANISH COORDINATION REQUEST

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 10-16 Apr 87 p 2

[Excerpts] Portugal is considering whether to use its right to veto, within the NATO framework, the Spanish request to coordinate its national command directly with the allied higher commands, well-informed sources stated to our newspaper.

Spain cannot have the same rights as other members with military participation and at the same time keep on the sidelines of the Alliance's collective defense efforts. This summarizes the position that our country will take in the last week in May in Brussels at the meeting of the Defense Planning Committee, constituted by the Alliance's ministers of defense. Our newspaper was told that initially, our country will only assume a political position against the manner in which Spain's connection with the NATO military structures was processed. However, Lisbon is not excluding its right to have recourse to a veto to prevent any coordination agreement between the Spanish command and the NATO higher commands. It was stressed that a solution of this type may entail, among other consequences, an underestimation of Portugal's role in the Atlantic Alliance's defense system. In Portugal's view, the framework of bilateral agreements between Spain and the NATO allies would be more appropriate for the implementation of the desired military coordination.

Spain does not belong to the integrated NATO military structure, but has had full access to the nerve centers of the organization, such as the Military Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, and has received highly classified operational documents. Portuguese circles have not hesitated to characterize such a situation as "anomalous." Moreover, Spain only contributes to NATO's civilian budget, while its participation in the military infrastructures program is nonexistent.

At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council that took place after the Spanish referendum [on NATO participation], Spain submitted a document detailing the general principles of its participation in NATO. According to some observers, these principles outline a kind of relationship that may be considered a way to enter the military structure "from the back door."

At that time, several "decisive" members of the Alliance--the United States, Canada, the FRG, the United Kingdom and Norway--had declared that their governments would have preferred that Spain integrate itself into NATO's military structure. However, Portugal had abstained from assuming any political position on the subject.